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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit at the European University Institute was created to 
further three main goals. First, to continue the development of the European 
University Institute as a forum for critical discussion of key items on the 
Community agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to scholars 
of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual research projects on topics of 
current interest to the European Communities. Both as in-depth background 
studies and as policy analyses in their own right, these projects should prove 
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Privatisation of British Airways:
Its M anagem ent and Politics 1982-1987*
K yo hei Shibata* *
Introduction
This paper aims at describing the course of events concerning British 
Airways pic from 1982 to February 1987. The period was chosen to provide 
a picture of how a state-owned air transportation company, envisaging 
privatisation and increase of competition, was reshuffled, managed, and 
prepared for flotation.
In 1993, European air transportation was, at least nominally, liberalised. 
Airlines are now allowed to set fares as they wish and to start or cease 
service on routes as they prefer. As is well known, airline deregulation 
originated in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 in the United States. The 
next year, Congress adopted the International Air Transportation 
Competition Act of 1979, and the U.S. government set out a policy of 
international deregulation, especially in regard to the Western industrialised 
countries. This policy has caused and still is causing deep repercussions 
among the nations but response differs from one to another. In the Far East, 
for example, Japan responded with a multi-airline policy which ended the 
monopoly of Japan Air Lines in the international scheduled service, 
although a tight regulation on aviation persists to date.
*
The research was funded by the Faculty of Economics, Shinshu University, Japan. The 
first draft was published under the same title by the Faculty as Staff Paper Series 1993- 
01, in May 1993. In this final version, several sentences are added and the conclusion 
is slightly enlarged. In the footnotes, FT stands for Financial Times and ST for Sunday 
Times. Unless otherwise indicated, dates of the articles are of the year corresponding to 
each chapter.
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Economics, Shinshu University, and Visiting Fellow



























































































Europe reacted differently. We find here three characteristics. First, the 
American deregulation was largely taken as a model to be followed. While 
the Treaty of Rome called for competition in the single market to occur, 
Europe had no country with liberal domestic air transportation. The only 
precedent was the U.S. Thus the American experience was taken in Europe 
(or at least in Britain) as a model showing how fares can be low if left to 
market forces.1
Secondly, as a result of this, lower fares were much more emphasised 
than deregulation itself. One result of this was anticipation of lower fares 
prior to deregulation in several instances.
Thirdly, international deregulation was promoted without in association 
with domestic deregulation, or rather, it was advocated by the countries that 
were liberalising domestic aviation. In the EC, deregulation of air 
transportation did not only mean domestic laissez-faire within each member 
country but international deregulation involving more than ten countries. In 
this aspect the European experience stands unique. Some member countries 
were prepared for deregulation while others were not. The British 
government under Prime Minister Thatcher was one of the most 
deregulation-oriented within the EC. In the Council of Ministers in charge 
of transportation, successive British ministers continuously advocated 
deregulation of air transport services. The privatisation of BA was pursued 
in parallel with this policy.
One question, then, is why the British were eager to promote it? The 
answer is, arguably, multi-fold. One explanation is that this suited the 
British traditional inclination toward free trade and mercantilism. In the 
field of aviation, Laker Airways had already shown that independent 
international operation at cut-prices was in the interest of the consumers 
and, therefore, feasible.
Another explanation is that the British were in a position to feel the wind 
of the American deregulation the most. The traffic between UK and the 
U.S. was the largest in transatlantic aviation (it has been, and is, the largest 
in international aviation too), which made the British public recognise and 
lament the comparatively expensive prices of European air travel. This 
derived also from the fact that Britain is an island situated between the U.S. 
and the European continent, which makes it far more natural for people to 
fly when going abroad, either for business or for holiday, than their 
European neighbours. 1
1 In a spate of literature on the topic, air fares in Europe, both domestic and 
international, were always put in comparison with American domestic fares or 
transatlantic fares. See for example: Sean D. Barrett, Flying High: Airline Prices and 




























































































However, these historico-geographical factors would not have wrought 
changes unless a particular government found it advantageous for it to 
pursue a particular policy. And this policy was part of a wider set of 
policies. To put it otherwise, the course of privatisation of BA should be 
analysed in the broader context of the then government’s ideological, 
financial, political, and diplomatic concerns.
The set of policies of the British government, so far as the aviation was 
concerned, consisted of several ingredients. One was privatisation. A wide 
range of state organisations related to aviation were transferred to the 
private sector. In the field of manufacturing, British Aerospace (air-frame), 
Rolls-Royce (engine), and Royal Ordnance Factories (weaponry) became 
candidates of privatisation. In air transport, not only BA but also the British 
Airport Authority, an airport operator, were put up for sale. Very roughly 
speaking, the ideological concern here was, as in the other industries; 
promotion of competition and efficiency. The financial concern was to cut 
government expenditure. And the political concern was, as argued later, to 
win elections.
The second ingredient was to develop local economies. The British 
policy of air transport liberalisation was closely related to this policy. Its 
domestic deregulation, as well as expansion of destinations especially to 
Europe, was mostly concerned with local airports such as, for example, 
Manchester and Birmingham. No doubt political concern was central here.
The third was to enlarge the country’s overall capacity and 
competitiveness in the field of aviation. The constructions of new terminals 
at Heathrow, London Dockland Airport (Stolport), and, later, Stansted, were 
aimed at maintaining the position of London as the biggest gateway to 
Europe. Also, the British government welcomed the rise of smaller 
independent carriers prepared to offer lower fares.
These three ingredients, then, provided the British government with 
confidence that the country would benefit, probably the most, from the air 
transport deregulation in Europe. Thus the UK voiced opposition against the 
tight regulation of air transport in Europe. This attitude was bound to be 
welcomed by the people but, more importantly, air transportation was one 
subject of negotiation at the EC level on which the British government 
could adopt a more liberal stance than its fellow members, and allowed it 
to bargain or offset some other issues UK held on defense, such as road 
haulage.
The above observation, however superficial, raises yet another question. 
That is, whether a country can promote liberalisation of international air 
transport without deregulating its domestic market. The cases of the U.S. 
and UK seem to suggest a negative answer. Essentially, regulation of air 




























































































capacity, at how much costs, and for which price. A complete deregulation 
aims to leave operators to decide all these factors.
Apparently, however, such a policy reversal cannot take place without 
being associated with radical change in the domestic regulation. This 
suggests, in turn, that countries with large domestic air transport networks 
may find the change more formidable than those without. It is no 
coincidence that the member countries of the EC with relatively large 
domestic air transport networks, such as France, Italy, Germany; and 
Scandinavian nations, adopted protective attitudes. By the same token, it is 
also no wonder that such countries as Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland, 
and, although not a member, Switzerland, each having relatively small 
domestic networks but airlines with extensive international networks, the so- 
called “merchant airlines” , were prepared to meet a deregulated 
environment although they would feel much less of a political need to take 
the initiative. In this regard, the UK was peculiar.
However, the privatisation of BA made it particularly difficult for the 
British government to maintain consistency. One reason lay in the 
discrepancy between ideological logic and political needs. On the one hand, 
state intervention, including state ownership, was deemed to hinder 
competition and efficiency. Privatisation was thought necessary because 
state-owned companies, including BA, were inefficient. In order to force 
them to gain or regain efficiency, they should be thrown into competition. 
Competition would be secured by deregulation. Hence privatisation and 
deregulation were, at least in thought, to be pursued at the same time.
On the other hand, disposal of state assets should be gainful both 
financially and politically. To put it otherwise, companies to be privatised 
had to be a good investment. Thus the state-owned companies were 
required to be already attractive (competitive in some way), when going 
public. This was the essential task for the management of BA.
The importance of BA in the British aviation industry caused other 
dilemmas. First, privatisation of BA would, it was argued, result in quick 
elimination of the smaller operators. Second, the British government could 
not maintain consistency in advocating international air transport 
deregulation. Its attitude toward the U.S. and the Far East countries was 
different from that toward domestic and European areas. The policy in 
regard to the U.S. was further complicated by a diplomatic dispute over 
territorial coverage of jurisdiction, which is essential to sovereignty. The 
underlying fact of this inconsistency was that the British government had 
no airline able to substitute for BA.
Due to these dilemmas and contradictions inherent in the government’s 
policy or set of policies, and also ad-hoc incidents, the privatisation of BA 
followed a tremendous zig-zag course. The following pages aim to recount 






























































































British Airways underwent a considerable change in 1982. In February 
1981, Sir John King (later Lord King of Wartnaby) was appointed to chair 
the board of BA. He was bom in 1917, became managing director of 
Whitehouse Industries Ltd. in 1945, and, from 1972, chairman of Babcock 
International pic, an engineering firm. As his career shows, he had been 
mostly in the engineering business,1 and once was offered the chairmanship 
of British Steel. It is also reported that he is one of the close friends of the 
then Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher (later Lady Thatcher). His task was to 
privatise the airline, which was wholly state-owned since its formation in 
April 1974, as the result of merger between BOAC and BE A.
1. King’s Caution Toward Privatisation Date
Many decisions made in the course of the privatisation of BA were closely 
related to the privatisation policy pursued by the Thatcher administration. 
Of course, as Civil Aviation Authority argued in its report, “the avowed 
aim of privatisation was the promotion of competition” .2 Although the 
objectives of this policy are beyond the scope of this paper, an article by 
Vickers & Yarrow could be mentioned, since it deals with political 
advantages implied in the British privatisation policy.3 According to 
Vickers & Yarrow, firstly, proceeds from government-owned asset sales are 
not classed as borrowings in the national accounts, thus in fact reducing the 
PSBR (Public Sector Borrowing Requirement), and secondly, asset 
disposals are treated as negative government spending in the British 
national accounting system, therefore reducing, by a corresponding sum,
1 Cf. WHO’S WHO, European Business and Industry 1988-1989, vol. 1, Munich, p. 615. 
As for his profile, cf. Times 15 July 1983, p. 12 and FT 1 May 1983, p. 19.
2 Quoted in Robert Baldwin, “ Privatisation and Regulation: The Case of British 
Airways” , in J.J. Richardson (ed.), Privatisation and Deregulation in Canada and 
Britain, Dartmouth Publishing Co. Ltd., 1990, p. 97.
3 Cf. John Vickers and George Yarrow, “ Privatisation in Britain” as chapter 4 of, 
MaCavoy et al., Privatisation and State-Owned Enterprises: Lessons from the United 
States, Great Britain and Canada, Rochester Studies in Economics and Policy Issues, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989, pp. 209-245. For broader implications, David 





























































































government expenditure.4 These remarks may not wholly explain BA’s 
decisions and actions in 1982, but give a view of what the government was 
tempted to avoid in course of its privatisation policy.
As for the date of privatisation, Iain Sproat, the then Under Secretary of 
State for Trade in charge of aviation, stated on various occasions that BA 
was to be privatised “before the next general election” . Although this 
outright combination of political advantage and business was deemed to be 
his private ambition, Sproat’s incessant confirmation on this matter helped 
greatly King’s implementation of radical reforms in BA, while King himself 
cautiously avoided to refer to the date of privatisation. At the beginning of 
October 1982, it was reported that King had said in Hong Kong that the 
privatisation would be achieved during the then government’s lifetime. On 
returning to Britain, he quickly denied the news.5 Although it is likely that 
he did talk as reported, King clearly wanted to keep himself away from this 
very political issue, with an intention to act, presumably, as a middleman 
under irresistible and arbitrary constraint.
2. Slimdown of the Company
The measures he took during 1982 can be divided in two categories. First 
was a radical slimdown of the overall size of the company, both in terms 
of manpower and flight operation. Second was the setting up of profit 
consciousness, through organisational reshuffling, from top to bottom.
The slimdown scheme was first introduced in September 1981, under an 
appellation “ survival plan” , and journalists often described it as a 
“ retrenchment program”. According to this plan, the number of personnel 
was to be brought down from 52,300 to 43,000 by March 1983. A special 
severance scheme was introduced, offering extra payments to those who 
applied for voluntary redundancy.6 Some 12,800 applied, and the number 
of employees decreased to 44,500 as of February 1982. After a major 
organisational restructuring in May, the management announced a plan to 
further cut, i.e., down to 35,000, and officially notified this intention to 
union leaders in September. It does not seem that further cutting was 
successful: as of March 1983, the company still had 37,500.
That nearly one quarter of manpower declared their willingness to leave 
the company was said to be reflecting the critical state of employee morale. 
Yet there are some counter proofs. First, when 2,000 ramp workers
4 Vickers and Yarrow, op. cit., p. 218.
5 Cf. Times 2 Oct., p. 2; FT 2 Oct., p. 4.




























































































abstained from work at Terminal One of Heathrow Airport in February 10 
to 11 in a dispute over longer work time and work rule changes, a number 
of pilots and office staff took over the job of baggage loading, allowing 
more than 50% of flights to take place.7 The second counter proof may be 
found in the turning around of the company’s Highland service, a case 
where simple delegation of authority resulted in higher motivation, 
voluntary cross-subsidisation of jobs and substantial improvement in 
accountability.8 Another proof is that BA’s on-time performance was 
improving.9 From a business administration point of view, it must be of 
particular interest to know how the severance scheme was operated and 
what category of employees (age, job, union affiliation, experience, etc.) left 
the company in this period.
Annual reports of BA show the breakdown of manpower. Yet grouping 
differs from one year to another between the periods 1981-82, 1982-83, so 
that precise and direct comparison is impossible. However, it is almost 
certain that the most affected were those who were not directly engaged in 
flight and maintenance operations.10 1*
As for flight operations, unprofitable routes were being abandoned and 
capacity would be reviewed and altered, in accordance with setting up of 
profit-centre structure at the beginning of May. An implication is that the 
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) allowed BA to drop certain destinations, 
while it was allowing other airlines to compete with BA in important 
domestic markets.11 The most hit were shuttle routes between London and 
Glasgow/Edinburgh. British Midland Airways snatched one third of BA’s 
business within a year.
As well, uneconomical planes were retired and put up for sale. By 
October, 22 aircraft had been sold off, bringing its fleet to 156 aircraft from 
181 two years earlier. The sale included three Boeing 747s, one Boeing
7 Cf. FT 10 Feb., p. 6 , 11 Feb., p. 10. This strike, led by the Transport and General 
Workers Union, lasted for six weeks, and blew up again in September of the next year. 
Cf. Times 12 Sept. 1983, p. 2.
8 Cf. ST 25 Apr., p. 56; British Airways, Report and Accounts 1982-83, p. 12. For 
description of posterior situation, see FT 6 July 1985, p. 5.
9 Cf. Air Transport World, June 1981, pp. 65-67; loc. cit., Mar. 1982, p. 66.
10 Cf. Air Transport World, Nov. 1981, p. 23.
11 Cf. Kenneth Button and Denis Swann, “ Aviation policy in Europe” , chap. 4 of 
Kenneth Button (ed.), Airline Deregulation. International Experience, David Fulton 
Publishers, 1991, p. 96 below. Also, Kenneth Button and Denis Swann, “ European
Community Airlines -  Deregulation Problems” , Journal o f Common Market Studies, 




























































































747F,12 three Boeing 707s, one VC10, seven Viscounts, and seven 
Tridents. In addition, the Royal Air Force decided to buy six Lockheed- 
1011-500 TriStars from BA for conversion to airborne tankers.13 In the 
course, Trident fleet was cut from 39 aircraft in March 1982 to 25 in two 
years; all Viscounts were sold.
In parallel, a major program of aircraft purchase was taking place. In 
October 1978, BA ordered nineteen Boeing 757s, with eighteen more 
optional. The price was estimated to be £400 million. B757s were powered 
by Rolls-Royce RB211-535C engines, with 189-seat capacity, and aimed to 
replace 139/146-seat Trident Threes (BA had 25 of them) for short-haul 
routes. The first two 757s were to be delivered by March 1983, but due to 
financial constraints, BA had to arrange a lease-back agreement with Air 
Europe.14
As BA had already completed its purchase of twenty-eight Boeing 737- 
200s, there was certainly a fleet-standardisation taking course. As is well 
known, British state-owned airlines have often been submitted to a “buy 
British” policy.15 *But it would be premature to regard this period as a 
departure from this constraint, since more than half of its jumbo jets, as 
well as its L-lOlls, and, as stated above, B757s were equipped with Rolls- 
Royce engines.
3. Profit Centre Structure
Organisational reshuffling which took place during 1982 was twofold. The 
first was a series of departure from the board, and the second setting up of 
profit centre structure.
The board of BA was a two level structure. The main board had six full­
time executives and nine part-timers as of late 1981. Of them, one left at 
the end of 1981, and two in February 1982, before submission of a report
12 Although this was the only Jumbo freighter of BA, the company continued its North- 
Atlantic cargo operation. Cf. FT 3 Mar. 1983, p. 19, 8 Jan. 1985, p. 15.
13 The deal included hard competitive selling utilising DClOs. In fact the chairman of 
British Caledonian bitterly criticized the decision taken by RAF, which he regarded as 
an indirect and unfair injection of public money to its rival. Cf. FT 16 Dec., p. 8.
14 For the purchase, see Air Transport World, Apr. 1983, pp. 65-66.
15 Cf. Robert L. Thornton, International Airlines and Politics, Michigan International
Studies no.13, reprinted by University Microfilm International, 1978, p. 103, and 
Richard Pryke, The Nationalised Industries: Policies and Performance since 1968, 
Martin Robertson, 1981, [5. 132. The operating costs of Trident Three were 6% higher 




























































































by Price Waterhouse.16 On the other hand, Gordon Dunlop was appointed 
as chief financial officer in June, a post hitherto nonexistent in the main 
board. The lower one, the executive management board, was composed of 
eleven directors. The chief executive officer (Group Managing Director) 
was Roy Watts, who was also a deputy chairman of the company. Of this 
board, at least four left in that year. The first to go was Roger Moss, 
finance director since 1974, who was virtually fired by King the day before 
the Price Waterhouse report was submitted to the company. In June, Alan 
Ponsford, director of public affairs retired; in the next month, chief of 
Intercontinental Services Division, Gerry Draper, left the post, which he had 
assumed less than three months earlier. A month later, Stephen Wheatcroft, 
director of economic development and also chairman of a subsidiary, British 
Airways Helicopter, announced retirement. As these departures often 
coincide with the period when the company’s financial results were being 
announced, it would be of particular interest to know how King, chairman 
of the board, used the bad financial performance of the company as an 
opportunity to put pressure onto long-sitting board members.
The second reshuffling took place at the end of April, when King 
announced a decentralisation plan, of which primary feature was setting up 
profit centre structure. Under the plan, main divisions were established, 
each being provided with their own budget and fleet, and expected to make 
profit. Under the three main divisions were sub-divisions, with similar 
means and aims at a smaller scale.17 To avoid unnecessary duplication,
16 Price Waterhouse is an accounting company in the City, which was commissioned to 
make a report on BA in September of 1981. Although the report was to be solely 
prepared for, and submitted to, the main board of BA and the government, newspapers 
began to report that there would be a major reorganisation in the board. King might 
have profited from these rumours in order to reshuffle the board. Members of the main 
board were selected by the government.
17 “ Each division w ill... produce a five-year plan for using the aircraft allotted to it and 
will have its own annual budget and profit and loss account. The divisions will have 
subsidiary profit centres designed to ensure that virtually every route makes money.” 
FT  29 Apr., p. 44. Main divisions were: Intercontinental Services Division, which would 
deal with long-haul international flights, European Services Division, which included 
domestic services, and Gatwick Services Division, which would control charter 
operations. As of 1 May, Intercontinental Services Division was composed of Concorde, 
African, Caribbean, North Africa, South Asia & Australasian, and North Atlantic. Later 
in the year, African and Caribbean subdivisions were integrated to form Southern Routes 
subdivision, and North Africa and South Asia & Australasian subdivisions to form 
Orient Routes subdivision. European Services Division was, after some modifications, 
came to have six subdivisions under it at the end of 1982, namely, Shuttle subdivision 
(London-based domestic shuttles), Birmingham subdivision, Manchester subdivision, 




























































































such common functions as coordinating of flight operation, computer 
services, and maintenance work were to be provided by central 
Departments.
Each general manager of subdivision was responsible for profit 
objectives. Although it is not clear whether they conceived these figures 
either as imposed norms or their own declared engagement (which is a 
critical factor in view of motivation), one can say that this profit centre 
structure aimed at an implementation of Management By Objectives, 
associated with delegation of authorities to a large extent. Given that BA 
made a turnaround that year, this MBO worked well. This suggests also that 
the employee morale was not necessarily bad, but rather responsive to a 
system which opened the way for participation and achievement. It is 
worthwhile to note that the management, on the other hand, was careful not 
to hamper the remaining employees’ motivation, and extended them as 
much as a 14% payhike in August.18 This idea of profit centre structure 
originated, apparently, from King’s business experience in the private 
sector. As King has said: “ if you take Marks and Spencer or Boots, they 
have a profit and loss account for every shop.”19 This statement might 
imply a departure from, or non-adherence to, the traditional concept of 
“ internal subsidy” for public service routes.20 A small step forward would 
lead to a concept of “ yield management” , which aims at making every 
flight profitable.21
4. An Overview of BA’s Finance and Market Position
There is no doubt that BA was in a financially difficult period. Publication 
of its annual report for the year 1981 --82 was unusually delayed, and when 
it was published in October, it revealed that the company’s long-term debt 
was more than £1 billion and that its equity capital had negative worth. 
Since this translates into absolute insolvency, from the private sector’s
London Provinces & Irish Routes subdivision.
18 Cf. ST 15 Aug., p. 37.
19 Quoted in ST 2 May, p. 60.
20 Thornton, op. cit., pp. 41-42.
21 Nawal K. Taneja, The International Airline Industry: Trends, Issues & Challenges, 
D.C.Heath, 1988, tr. into Japanese by Kunio Yoshida, pub. by Seizando, Tokyo, in 1989. 
p. 75 note; or Avishai Gil, “ Air Transport Deregulation and its Implications for Flight 




























































































viewpoint, BA was a bankrupt company.22 However, the company had 
been allowed to be in such a situation, precisely because the government, 
its powerful owner and sponsor, had been taking care of its balance sheet 
matters, in stumping capital and guaranteeing debts. Although no dividend 
had been paid on the state shareholding since 1979-80 period, the 
government had been injecting £10 million to BA in each of the preceding 
six financial years.23
Once privatised, such consistent and generous sponsorship could not be 
expected from any private shareholders. On the other hand, the British 
capital market was not familiar with airline stocks. Privatising BA was not 
a question of adding another airline stock to investors’ portfolio, but 
creating a new field of investment. Therefore, BA’s financial statements 
should appear decent and competitively attractive in regard to other 
industries. Furthermore, the fact that the initial subscribers would make 
money was not only a politically desirable outcome,24 but also, the 
government would have been tempted to assure that privatised companies 
stood on their own feet.25 Thus, it became almost imperative that BA be, 
if not a blue-chip, a healthy stock at the time of going public. The implicit 
fact that British government would never allow the country’s largest 
international air carrier to liquidate, regardless of whether it was private or 
not, was not enough for successful privatisation.
The biggest obstacle was the company’s long-term debt. All such 
measures to put the company into profitability as the fleet-modernisation, 
the massive redundancy scheme and the reorganisation of in-house 
structure, required further capital injections. In total, £1.5 billion was 
estimated to be needed. BA set out to sell its assets. In addition to the 
aircraft sale which was mentioned above, the properties and facilities put 
for sale included College of Air Training, a major training school for pilots 
in commercial aviation, Victoria Air-terminal, computer software, and 
International Aeradio pic (IAL).
IAL was involved in air timetables and maps, weather forecasting and 
hospital management. It was consistently profitable since its establishment 
in 1947, and earned £6.3m on revenues of £63.8m in 1980-81, and £9.3m 
on £91.6m in 1981-82. It employed about 4,500 people in more than 30 
countries. BA held 99% of its shares, the remaining being in the hands of
22 BA’s financial performance for the period of 1972 to 1982 is graphically shown in 
The Economist, 23 Oct. 1982.
23 BA paid as the dividend to the government £0.36 million in 1985-86 period, and 
£29.6 million in 1986-87. Cf. BA, Report and Accounts, 1985-86, 1986-87.
24 Cf. Vickers and Yarrow, op. cit., p. 221.




























































































various foreign airlines. As early as May, this very profitable subsidiary 
was put for sale through a method of tender-offer. Although the sale took 
place in the next year, we could already notice two fundamental factors of 
BA’s privatisation.
First, BA had a number of “crown jewels” , i.e., salable assets, which 
were underestimated in bookvalue but contained a potential value of 
sizeable gain once sold off.26 Indeed, the book value of IAL and its related 
companies was slightly more than £3m. Standard Telephone and Cables pic 
acquired them for £60m at the end of March 1983. College of Air Training 
(Properties) Ltd., another subsidiary spin off, was valued at £0.8m but sold 
for £5m in June 1982. In this regard, compared with some cases in the 
American airline industry, BA was fortunate to be shielded from the danger 
of corporate raiding.
Secondly, although it was estimated by the Price Waterhouse report that 
deduction in long-term debt to the tune of £500m to £750m would be 
necessary to make BA viable for sale, the British government was not 
willing to wipe out BA’s debt with public money. The reason for this 
reluctance was certainly political. Injection of public money would mean 
more expenditure, therefore risking an increase in the PSBR, an effect 
contradictory to the aims of the privatisation policy. Furthermore, it was 
doubtful whether the sale of BA shares, however successful, could be still 
rewarding after spending a lot to clean up the company’s balance-sheet.27 *
On the political level, repayment of debt with public money would 
immediately cause criticism about unfair and unjustifiable subsidy in an 
industry which the government was pushing toward increased competition.
Another fundamental factor is that, while the government did promote 
increase of competition, it would never hamper BA’s basic competitive 
advantages in the marketplace, principally because it was anxious to assure 
a successful flotation. This contradictory policy would be a characteristic 
of the British government’s air transportation policy toward 1987. On the 
other hand, since each profit centre meant to be profitable, BA would 
fiercely resist every threat that was likely to endanger the profitability of its 
routes. For example, in September 1982, BA threatened to withdraw from
26 At the end of March, 1982, the company had 19 subsidiaries, among which 13 were 
operating, and 28 associated companies. Cf. British Airways, Report and Accounts 
1981182, notes 11, 12. As for sale of its real estates, cf. FT 10 Aug. 1984, p. 7.
27 The gross proceeds for the government was £900m when privatisation finally took




























































































internal German services when the West German Finance Minister proposed 
to phase out the subsidy for Berlin flights.28
It must be mentioned that the overall profit and loss aspect of BA was 
not as critical as the press argued, despite the record loss for 1981-82 
period to the tune of £544m. There are a number of reasons. First, the 
company’s market share was extraordinarily high. After all, “ in 1982 BA 
alone accounted for 65% of total UK airline output and 81% of output on 
scheduled services.”29 In addition to this overwhelming share in transport 
capacity, BA enjoyed the privileged position of the sole British scheduled 
carrier that flew to overseas destinations from Heathrow until 1985.30
Secondly, its workforce had already been slimmed down, a critical task 
which its American rivals would find terribly difficult to achieve. Indeed 
the proportion of payroll in the total operating expenditure on airline 
operation had already been brought down from 33.2% in 1980-81 to 31.7% 
in 1981-82. It continued to decrease: 29.2% in 1982-83 and 24.8% in 1983- 
84, a figure comparable to American “upstarts” , which operated on “no­
union, no-frills” basis.31 Furthermore the 1981-82 period did record a 
small operating profit, i.e., £0.9m for BA Board, and £5.9m on a 
consolidated basis. It was largely due to the accounting policy by which the 
costs of the redundancy scheme for 1982-83, which was some £199m, and 
already included in account, that 1981-82 appeared a disastrous year.32 *
Thirdly, its fleet was being modernised, together with shortening of 
depreciation period for obsolescent aircraft. The writing down amounted to 
£208m.
28 Cf. FT 16 Aug., p. 3, 1 Sept., p. 5. Subsequently, the new government under Helmut 
Kohl reversed the proposal. Cf. FT 19 Oct., p. 6.
29 Baldwin, op. cit., p. 95. The share is measured by ATK, available-tonne-kilometers. 
In terms of passengers carried, as of 1983, BA accounted for 31%, the foreign carriers 
32%, and the others 37%, still showing BA’s supremacy. Cf. FT 20 Aug. 1984, p. 3.
30 This privilege was considered as equivalent to a subsidy of £50 million per year. Cf. 
Mark Ashworth and Peter Forsyth, “ British Airways: Privatisation and Airline 
Regulatory Policy” , as chap. 8 of John Kay, Colin Mayer, and David Thompson, 
Privatisation and Regulation: The UK Experience, Clarendon Press, 1986, p. 165. In 
June 1985, British Midland Airways was allowed as the second British airline to launch 
international scheduled services out of Heathrow.
31 For international comparison, see Rigas Doganis, Flying Off Course: The Economics 
o f International Airlines, George Allen & Unwin, 1985, pp. 90-91.
32 For a detailed analysis on BA’s accounting policy in this period, see Mark Ashworth
and Peter Forsyth, Civil Aviation Policy and the Privatisation o f British Airways, IFS 




























































































Finally, it was virtually guaranteed that its creditors would not resort to 
take forcible measures that would have been put into force had BA been a 
private enterprise. BA often claimed that most of its capital borrowings 
were contracted on commercial terms. Probably the interests were different 
from the Treasury’s direct borrowing. But the Treasury guaranteed for a 
large part of its long-term debt as to principal and interest payment, as well 
as against exchange risk. Obviously banks extended loans to BA because 
it was a government-guaranteed borrower. It is doubtful whether BA could 
have raised capital in various currencies in 1981-82 period, as it did, if it 
had not been a nationalised company.33
It should also be borne in mind that BA covered a very wide -  almost 
comprehensive -  range of air travelling segments. As already noted, 
business travellers ranked BA high. For the highest layer of the market 
segment, BA had the unique asset of the Concorde. Budget travellers were 
offered a variety of discount fares that were competitively set (Apex, Saver 
fares, Super Savers). The holiday tour segment was covered by British 
Airtours Ltd., whole-plane charter subsidiary, as well as by such package 
tour subsidiaries as British Airways Tour Operations Ltd. and Martin Rooks 
& Co.Ltd., under brands of Enterprise, Sovereign, Flair and Martin Rooks. 
It even had a helicopter operation subsidiary, British Airways Helicopter 
Ltd., which flew to the North Sea oilfields.34 Its computer reservation 
system, Travel Automation Services, known as Travicom and now as 
Galileo, was dominant in the travel booking industry in the UK. In this 
regard, one could even simplify the picture to say that BA was the civil 
aviation industry itself in the UK, not a fraction of it, and that all the 
independents, including charter operators, were but marginal derivatives. Its 
supremacy is well illustrated by its fleet; as of 1985, the airlines based in 
Britain had 31 B747s on service, of which 28 were operated by BA, 2 by 
BCal, and 1 by Virgin Atlantic Airways. No other domestic rival could 
afford to engage in a full-scale struggle with this empire. In conclusion, it 
is difficult to find any critical competitive disadvantage.
33 BA, Report and Accounts 1981-82, p. 31 note 18.a. See also Ashworth and Forsyth, 
loc. cit., pp. 97-101.




























































































II. 1983: Toward M arketing-oriented Structure
1983 for BA could be regarded as a year when further steps were taken in 
the course King had set. Here we find six topics. First, further 
organizational restructuring took place under a new chief executive. Second, 
a series of fare adjustments was attempted in both domestic and 
international markets. Third, BA returned to profitability. Fourth, BA tried 
to protect its domestic market through court action. Fifth, a decision was 
taken to lease Boeing 737s. And lastly, the date and process of privatisation 
was contested.
1. Marketing-oriented Structure
In mid-January, it was announced that Colin Marshall was to assume the 
post of chief executive from the next month. Marshall, 49 years old, had 
spent much of his life in the international car-rental and retail-chain 
business (at Hertz from 1959 to 1964, at Avis from 1964 to 1981, and since 
1981, at Sears Holdings). He, like King, seemed to be concerned with 
efficiency and competitiveness. As a result of his business experience in the 
U.S., he was even more marketing-oriented, saying: “ I learned a lot across 
an enormous spectrum of US business -  from Norton Simon’s concept of 
a holding company to IT&T’s approach of having a powerful head office 
staff.” 1
With his appointment, Roy Watts’ double function as group managing 
director and deputy chairman was reduced to the latter. Hereafter, the day- 
to-day management was to be run by Marshall, and King seemed to 
concentrate himself on the privatisation issue, although he continued to keep 
tight control on the two-tier boards of BA.
Marshall was quick. As early as mid-February, he set up a top-level 
marketing team of five members. The team was responsible for marketing 
services, cargo marketing, distribution and passenger services, and research 
and development in marketing. Essentially, this was a staff section to devise 
global marketing policies, but which “the rest of the airline will be required 
to follow” ? Obviously, the basic idea was a product manager system (or 
sometimes referred to as total marketing system), in which each product 
manager is responsible for budget and objective figures, plans the product, 12
1 Quoted in ST 16 Jan., p. 53. Norton Simon and IT&T were both holders of Avis.




























































































and coordinates the production line and sales section. It is well known that 
in order to run this system, organisations must have a marketing-centred 
structure.
On 11 July, King announced that 70 top managers were to be made 
redundant. Among them were three general managers of the main divisions 
and the head of industry affairs, also a board member. The main divisions 
established in the previous May were abolished and a single “ Marketing 
Division” was established. Ten former subdivisions were reshuffled and 
centralised into eight “market centres” under the Marketing Division.3 
Cargo, charters and tours operations were established as “business 
centres” , which were also under the Marketing Division, and as market 
centres, were separately accountable for profitability. Along with the 
Marketing Division was established “Operations Division” which “ sold” 
such supporting services directly related to flight operation as cockpit and 
cabin crew, engineering, catering and ground works. Overhead activities 
such as safety, finance, human resources, etc. were charged to staff 
sections.4
Therefore, a crew who worked on a jumbo jet on the Tokyo-London 
route did not belong any more to Far East subdivision. They were, at least 
conceptually, dispatched from, or procured by, the Operations Division to 
Far East market centre of the Marketing Division. Thus market centres were 
intended to be like autonomous retail chain shops, whose function was to 
plan, acquire and sell the product of BA. This is a radical departure from 
the former structure which, after all, had been based on a traditional 
concept of regional division of flight personnel. More importantly, the move 
was associated with a stress on the product of BA being service, not merely 
seats. Offering service to the satisfaction of customers requires marketing- 
oriented attitude. Needless to say, it also requires another form of 
organisation. Very roughly speaking, a distinction was introduced between 
front stores and production line. The product manager system was built into 
the company.
The organisation being reconstructed as such, it is no wonder that BA 
proceeded to launch a major advertising campaign in April. The catch- 
phrase “The World’s Favourite Airline” and a computer-graphical TV 
commercial film were works of Saatchi & Saatchi, which had been
3 They were United Kingdom, North Europe (comprising the former Internal German 
subdivision), South Europe, Americas (covering the U.S., Canada and Caribbean regions 
as well as Concorde flights), Africa, Middle East & Indian Subcontinent, Far East, and 
Australia & New Zealand.




























































































commissioned a year earlier. The campaign was intended to cover more 
than thirty countries, at a cost of £25m.5 This marketing drive would go 
further toward a Corporate Image (Cl) campaign in the next year, with 
aircraft colouring and livery changed. All these moves were not only to 
boost revenues but, more importantly, closely associated with the internal 
organisational restructuring. As is well known, a corporate image campaign 
requires a thorough analysis and re-positioning of the company in the 
industry arena, and aims at refreshing loyalty and motivation of employees 
while promoting a renewed image toward the outside. Although it is 
difficult to know whether these steps had already been programmed and put 
into the time-table, BA’s moves could be regarded as, if not theoretical, 
coherent.6
2. Fare Adjustments
Fare adjustments took place both on international and domestic routes, 
although the implications for each are different.
The first implication was a temporary, promotional price-reduction to 
give impetus to the travel market during winter to early-summer. For 
example, fares for flights to Spain were reduced by 20 to 40% for the 
period of 1st April to 19 May.7 Weekend flights on Irish routes were also
5 As for the details of this campaign, cf. FT 14 Apr., p. 20.
6 Saatchi & Saatchi was commissioned in place of Foote Cone and Belding, an 
American-owned agency, which had been in charge of advertising activities for British 
state-owned airline ever since the end of the Second World War. It may be worthwhile 
to note that we find a series of alterations in subcontractors during 1983. A catering 
equipment consortium set up by British companies won a contract to supply BA with 
disposable and reusable items in March. Cf. FT 15 Mar., p. 9. In the same month 
Bowring Group, a part of the U.S. insurance broking giant Marsh & McLennan 
Companies, lost the account (estimated to be £6.6m) after 60 years of service, to be 
replaced by the Sedgwick Group, the biggest independent British group. Cf. FT  17 Mar., 
p. 8. In August, a five-year contract was awarded to United Linen Services for overalls 
for BA’s industrial staff. Cf. FT 27 Aug., p. 17. In autumn, the galley systems in to-be- 
leased B737s were to be supplied by C.F. Taylor Metalworkers. Cf. FT 12 Nov., p. 17. 
And S.G.Warburg, the merchant bank in charge of the sale of IAL, was switched to 
Lazard Brothers & Co., Ltd. cf. ST 13 Nov., p. 53, FT 14 Nov., p. 32. These changes 
in subcontractors certainly reflect the general review on BA’s business relations, but also 
give an impression of a “ contract British” policy, which Howard Phelps, the operations 
director of the company, confirmed later. Cf. FT 10 Apr. 1984, p. 9.




























































































made cheaper during 5 February to 13 March.8 Those who travelled to 
Canada in the period of 1st March to 30 April, or to the U.S. before March, 
could also benefit from Super Apex (Advanced Purchase Excursion) fares.9 
Despite some fares being deeply cut, these reductions were made in concert 
with the foreign carriers concerned, such as Iberia and Air Lingus. Indeed, 
the fares to the U.S. were often discussed with the other transatlantic IATA 
member carriers. In January, they agreed to reduce Apex fares on London- 
U.S. routes from £386 in the last summer to £329, and in August, to £249 
after British Atlantic Airways (later Virgin Atlantic Airways) and People 
Express Inc. proposed to fly even more cheaply.10 1
On the other hand, BA increased prices for its first and business class by 
5% in January.11 According to a previous study jointly conducted by BA 
and CAA, it was suspected that there was a cross-subsidisation between 
fare-types.12 The study, based on 1976-77 accounts, showed that BA lost 
money on its first class but earned more on normal and Ipex (Instant 
purchase excursion) tickets, which, from a certain viewpoint, could be 
judged as a discriminatory practice. Therefore this rise, however modest, 
might be regarded as an attempt to redress the situation.
If the fare adjustments on these international routes were set in co­
ordination with the other carriers, domestic fares were not. At issue was 
shuttle services provided by BA on Heathrow-Glasgow/Edinburgh, 
Heathrow-Manchester, and Heathrow-Belfast routes. In February, BA 
proposed to the CAA to increase its fares from April. Heathrow-Glasgow’s 
return would be raised to £116 from the previous £110, Manchester £88 
from £81, and Belfast £116 from £106. The rivals also applied for 
increases.13 British Midland Airways, which had started to compete with 
BA on the Glasgow route in October 1982, and on the Edinburgh route 
since the beginning of 1983, proposed to set its fares for both at £105, 
slightly higher than the previous £99.14 BCal, which flew Gatwick-
8 Cf. FT 21 Jan., p. 21. It was already agreed with Air France to reduce fares from 
London to French provincial destinations for winter. Cf. FT 16 Oct. 1982, p. 3.
9 Cf. FT 31 Jan., p. 16; 11 Feb., p. 5. As for Apex and other types of cheap fares, cf. 
Pryke, op. cit., pp. 139-143.
10 Cf. FT 14 Jan., p. 5, 18 May, p. 7, 26 Aug., p. 10.
11 Cf. FT 25 Jan., p. 32.
12 Pryke, op. cit., pp. 141-143; The Economist 24 Nov. 1984, p. 71 chart.
13 Cf. FT 5 Feb., p. 4.




























































































Glasgow/Edinburgh proposed £118 instead of £110.15 CAA held a public 
hearing on 21 and 22 February, and announced on 8 March that it had 
acquiesced to all proposals but one. BA’s request for Belfast return fare at 
£116 was refused, but CAA permitted the airline to raise it to £112.16 
Probably the reason of refusal was that it represented the highest percentage 
of increase (9.4%) compared with the other proposals. However, this 
authoritative action was not only far from deregulation, but also suggested 
a threat of deep disturbance within BA’s internal profit system.
3. Return to Profitability
BA reported the first-half profit for 1982-83 period in October 1982. On 4 
May 1983, the annual results were made public, stating the company had 
posted a net profit of £77.2m on consolidated basis. At the same time King 
had his appointment extended to another term. Despite Sproat’s promises, 
the airline was still government-owned, and King was still reluctant to 
commit himself to a privatisation date, saying: “We want, above all, to see 
[the company] succeed. If we make it profitable, it’s for the proprietor to 
decide whether to sell it.”17
He insisted only that the profit should attain £250 million before BA 
went public. This figure, although referred to on various occasions, is not 
clear in origin. King might have been performing a traditional leadership 
role of setting a goal, or regarding this level necessary for successful 
privatisation. In any case, it was a very high figure, which represented 
around 10% of the total revenue or turnover of BA. Probably the Price 
Waterhouse report mentioned the figure, but it does not mean the figure 
was set without King’s involvement, because, after all, a business 
consultant’s job largely consists of stating what its client wants him to say 
with authority.
As for BA’s long-term debts, the sum increased by 4.2%, from 
£1,010.6m to £1,053.2m. This was mainly due to an increase of the dollar- 
denominated portion that was not covered against exchange risk by the 
Treasury. This portion was calculated with actual exchange rates, so that the 
sum in 1981-82 report, £214.4m for $392.2m ($=£0.55), became in 1982-83 
£299.lm for $444.7m ($=£0.67). In other words, this portion increased by
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.




























































































slightly more than 13% in dollar-term, but measured in sterling, by nearly 
40%.18
On the other hand, the biggest chunk of debt was comfortably covered 
by the Treasury against exchange risk. This portion accounted for about a 
half of the company’s long-term debt. But the value of the dollar was fixed 
at approximately £0.46. Had it not been so, the amount of this portion 
would have been £623m instead of £523.4m in 1981-82, and £770m instead 
of £519.6m in 1982-83.19
This simple calculation suggests two facts. First, BA’s financial 
performance was largely subject to exchange rate fluctuation, both in terms 
of its balance sheet as well as profit and loss account. International services 
divisions accounted for more than 80% of revenue, of which a substantial 
part was paid in US dollars. Fuel and oil, the second-largest item after 
payroll representing 26% of total airline operating expenditures, was also 
acquired in dollars.20 Earning and spending US dollars is an indispensable 
element of its business. As shown in the summer of 1984, the strong dollar, 
and therefore weak pound, contributes to its business.21
Secondly, the British government was indirectly subsidising the company. 
The decrease in the guaranteed debt portion means that the government lost 
the value of foreign exchange reserve at least by £0.8m during the 1982-83 
period. Moreover, all the loans and lease finances in dollar were guaranteed 
by The Treasury. These guarantees not only privileged BA to raise funds 
despite its technical insolvency, but also shielded the company to a
18 BA, Reports and Accounts 1982-83, p. 45 note 18. See also, Ashworth and Forsyth, 
op. cit., pp. 97-99.
19 This portion steadily decreased: £445m in 1983-84, £196m in 1984-85, £113m in 
1985-86, and £89m in 1986-87. Cf. BA, Report and Accounts, 1983-84, 1984-85, 1985- 
86, 1986-87.
20 The portion of the UK marketing centre in regard to the total airline revenue was 
16.3% in 1982-83, 16.0% in 1983-84, while that of the Americas, 28.8% and 26.6% 
respectively. Cf. BA, Reports and Accounts 1983-84, p. 50 note lb. In 1983, BA carried 
around 1.5m passengers between UK and USA, i.e., slightly less than 10% of all the 
passengers BA carried for 1983-84 period. Although “ the Americas”  includes the 
Caribbean, no doubt the U.S. was the lucrative area. Needless to say, aircraft purchases, 
which is the largest capital expenditure item for airlines, are made by dollar as well. 
BA’s forward foreign exchange purchase commitments amounted to $104m at the end 
of Mar. 1983, and $54 at the end of Mar. 1984.




























































































substantial degree from a liquidity crisis arising from exchange rate 
fluctuations, which triggered the fall of Laker Airways.22
Yet, BA’s profitable results were certainly a political success for the 
Thatcher administration, especially at the time when the general election 
was imminent. In this election Sproat lost his seat. Afterward, the 
ministerial responsibility for BA’s privatisation was handed over to a 
newly-appointed Secretary of State for Transport, Nicholas Ridley.
4. Domestic Competition
Domestic competition became noticeable in this year and we find some 
effects that deregulation-oriented policy-makers would like to regard as 
positive.
BA was losing market share on its Highland service. The main 
competitor was British Midland Airways (BMA), which offered £99-retum 
rate against BA’s £110 and snatched about 30% of the market. This price 
differential did not change at the price increase in 1983 because BA’s fare 
was to become £116 and that of BMA £105. One outright response would 
have been to reduce the fare to the same level, but it was not feasible for 
BA because of a particular feature of its shuttles. BA guaranteed a seat to 
full-fare passengers who checked in up to ten minutes before scheduled 
departure time, an operation requiring backup aircraft. In addition to this, 
in-flight payment was accepted. Even so, the flight was “no-frills” , i.e., 
meals or drinks were not served. On the other hand, BMA flew cheaper 
with more amenities on board, but no backup flight was available.23 *
In many regards, these differences are strikingly similar to the fierce 
competition between Eastern Air Lines’ shuttle service and New York 
Airways (NYA) in the Boston-New York-Washington area in early 1981. 
Eastern offered seat guarantees with backups, but no amenities. NYA, a 
new entrant, required prior reservation but provided more amenities at 
cheaper rates ($29 or $49, against $59). Seeing its market share quickly 
eroded, Eastern brought down the fares of some of its shuttle flights to the 
same level of its competitor, and distributed coupons to its passengers
22 As for the demise of Laker Airways, see Howard Banks, The Rise and Fall o f Freddie 
Laker, Faber and Faber, 1982, esp. chap. 13. Laker Airways was also subsidised in the 
loan related to its Airbus order. Ibid., pp. 129-130.
23 Cf. Peter Johnson, Airline Deregulation and New Entry: A Case Study o f the London-
Glasgow Route, Working Paper no. 82, Department of Economics, University of 




























































































which offered 50% discount on its transcontinental route. NYA responded 
by buying them for $15 from its passengers on board, and inviting Eastern’s 
passengers to pick up refreshments at NYA’s counter.24
Given the international character of the air transportation industry, the 
management of BA must have been knowledgeable of this precedent, which 
was welcomed by American administrators and consumers, but a horrifying 
situation for airlines. Moreover, BA’s main concern was profitability of 
each marketing centre rather than market-share. Its decision was to 
introduce “ frills” .25 In this “Super Shuttle” , which was also introduced 
on the Manchester and Belfast routes, passengers were offered free 
breakfast, free drinks on all flights, free newspapers and seat selection. An 
extensive advertising campaign was launched: on 30 August, the first three 
inaugurating flights to Glasgow were performed by Concorde. In devising 
these marketing tactics, the marketing team that Marshall had set up in 
February played a major role.26 As early as October, BA claimed the 
operation was successful and the market was recaptured.
Another domestic market worth noting is the Heathrow-Belfast route. 
Seemingly BA had been the sole carrier operating scheduled flights on this 
route. In early 1983 BMA, its main rival in Highland service, applied for 
the route to be serviced from autumn. The planned frequency, seven flights 
every weekday and four on weekends, was competitively dense and the fare 
was to be £105 return against BA’s £112. In a CAA hearing BA said it 
might close the shuttle service if BMA was permitted.27 Despite this threat 
CAA granted a license to BMA. Then BA skipped the usual procedure of 
appealing to the transport secretary (Tom King) in order to have CAA 
overruled, and applied directly on 25 August to the High Court for a 
ruling.28 The legal challenge failed, and criticism was levelled at BA’s 
action, which appeared as anti-competitive.29
24 Cf. Kyohei Shibata, “ Koku kisei kanwa ka no keiei kadai [Managerial tasks under 
the era of air transport deregulation]” , Journal o f Economic Review no.26. Faculty of 
Economics, Shinshu University, Matsumoto, Japan, 1988, p. 104; Business Week, 22 
Sept. 1980, “ A plucky challenge to Eastern’s shuttle” , pp. 42-44; loc. cit., 26 Jan. 1981, 
“ Deregulation breeds an East Coast air war” , p. 22.
25 The market, largely composed of business travellers, was price-inelastic. Cf. Johnson, 
op. c it, pp. 1-2.
26 Cf. FT 15 Apr. p. 9; BA, Report and Accounts 1983-84, p. 21.
27 Cf. Times 24 June, p. 1.
28 FT 26 Aug., pp. 5 and 10.




























































































However, to promote competition was not BA’s task. Its main task was 
to be successfully privatised, and to this end, the company should be 
profitable. Therefore it had reorganised itself, principally with a view to 
making every marketing centre profitable. Consequently, it had become 
profitable in the 1982-83 period, but not enough. The Belfast route was 
important, where BA deployed its newly-delivered B757s. BMA was 
undoubtedly a strong rival. It had already proved to be highly competitive 
in Highland markets, and applied for several routes other than Belfast.30
On the other hand, there had been symptoms indicating that BA could 
not expect favour from the administrative bodies. First, as stated above, 
CAA had denied to raise the fare as much as BA wished, which had 
certainly caused a re-planning on the profitability of the service. Second, 
BMA’s Scottish flights had been allowed the previous year despite the fact 
that BA opposed and CAA rejected the application, because the then 
secretary of state for trade, Lord Cockfield, overruled the CAA decision.31
It was clear that the government was reluctant to use its power to shield 
BA from increased competition, though they were anxious to see BA 
successfully privatised. The British government continued its subsidisation 
to the Concorde operation until March 1984, guaranteed the company’s 
debt, and acted on behalf of BA in the litigation of Laker Airways 
International. Nevertheless, when the issue became more directly related to 
the consumers’ purse, no help could be expected. After all, from the 
political viewpoint, “deregulation” should mean lower fares.
5. Fleet Decisions
UK aircraft-noise laws coming into force by 1986 were rendering BA’s 24 
Trident Threes obsolescent. Consequently, BA needed to replace the 146 
seaters.32 *Boeing and McDonnell Douglas were asked to submit proposals. 
Airbus Industrie, in which British Aerospace had a 20% stake, was at first 
neglected. As soon as the news was aired, a political argument flared up. 
The Labour Party argued that the government should take measures to help 
get the A320 (150 seats) project launched. The voices urging BA to opt for
30 Cf. FT 3 Oct., p. 4.
31 FT 26 Aug., p. 10.
32 The UK noise regulation was in accordance with a ruling by International Civil
Aviation Organisation. The programme of fleet modernisation was initiated under Sir 




























































































Airbus were industry-wide.33 Yet A320 had a serious disadvantage in that 
it would not be delivered until 1988. Furthermore, it was not certain 
whether the aircraft would be powered with Rolls-Royce engines. Various 
proposals and discounts, as well as pressures, were made during the 
summer.
Finally in early September, Boeing came out as the winner. BA would 
take a short-term lease on 14 B737-200, powered by Pratt & Whitney 
engines, with an option on a further 17. The aircraft, worth £166m, were 
to be bought by an Anglo-American financial consortium and then leased 
to BA. The decision seems consistent with BA’s situation, therefore, a 
sound one from the viewpoint of business management. As King put it, 
A320 might be a good plane to be decisively turned down. McDonnell 
Douglas’ aircraft would require new parts and probably more staff. A 
leasing deal was fit to the company’s financial needs since it did not 
increase long-term debt. Indeed, the following words of King, announcing 
the decision on 15 August, make a sharp contrast to Pan Am’s paternalistic 
(and proved-to-be fatal) arrogance.34
[A320] remains a paper aeroplane and I am not in the business of launching new 
aeroplanes....We have worked too hard to get this airline right to be able to afford to 
take a gamble on a new aircraft now.35
33 ST 24 July, p. 45; FT 15 Aug., p. 7; Times 9 Sept., p. 4. As for the techno-nationalist 
attitude in the field of aviation peculiar to Britain and its origin, see David Edgerton, 
England and Aeroplane: An Essay on a Militant and Technological Nation, McMillan 
Academic and Professional Ltd., 1991, especially chap. 5. BAe itself was owned by the 
government by slightly less than 50% until May, 1985. For BAe’s privatisation and its 
acquisition of Royal Ordnance Factories, see Keith Howard, The British Aircraft 
Industry, Manchester UP, 1989, pp. 173-177.
34 When Pan Am decided to purchase Tristars, one executive said that the order would 
“ make Lockheed” , which was desperate to get into commercial airliner business again. 
Cf. Business Week, 17 Apr. 1978, “ Lockheed’s high hopes” , p. 44. Pan Am’s 
manoeuvre in obtaining a favourable financial package is vividly presented in John 
Newhouse, The Sporty Game, Alfred A. Knopf, 1982, pp. 56-57, 61-73.
35 Quoted in FT 16 Aug., p. 5. It should also be noted that Sir Frank McFadzean, the 
predecessor of King, had already made the decision to update BA’s fleet with American 




























































































6. Privatisation Date and Process
The new government formed after the election was determined to continue 
a “ deregulation” and privatisation policy, but less clear with respect to how 
and when. So far as BA was concerned, the question was multifold since 
the government’s interests and those of the company were not always the 
same. For example, the government wanted to attract British individual 
investors as BA’s shareholders, while King preferred institutional ones, 
presumably in hope of having faithful stockholders. Their views on how to 
make BA attractive to investors were also different. From BA’s point of 
view, the simplest solution was an injection of public money, either to have 
the debt equity ratio lessened or to have the debt repaid outright. Yet the 
government was naturally reluctant to take either choice. Another difference 
arose when British Telecom, another candidate for privatisation due the 
following year, met resistance from its trade union.36 Seemingly King 
profited from this and committed himself, very probably for the first time, 
to the date of privatisation, in saying that BA would be ready to go public 
by the autumn of 1984.37
Obviously, he was sure that the “Super Shuttle” would be successful, 
and the company would have attained its profit goal of £250m by next 
March, or at least would be very near to it by the first half of the 1984-85 
period. But in any case, it remained that BA should wipe off its debts, and 
the government was not prepared to spend public money for that. On the 
contrary, the proceeds of the sale of IAL was decided to be repaid to the 
government in the form of a decrease in BA’s external finance limit.38 A 
possibility of a “bridging loan” was discussed between the government and 
City institutions,39 while Ridley confirmed the government’s intention to 
privatise BA.
Sir Adam Thomson, chairman of BCal, was alert to these developments. 
On 3 November, the day before BA’s half-year results were announced, he 
submitted to the government a proposal for a massive transfer of routes, 
including some flight equipment, from BA to his company at a price of 
£200m.40 Thomson added that if BA was privatised with its financial 
burden lightened, BCal would be forced to move its operations from
36 Cf. Times 25 Oct., p. 2.
37 Cf. Times 15 Aug., p. 1.
38 Cf. FT 25 Oct., p. 8.
39 Cf. Times 25 Oct., p. 2.




























































































Gatwick to Heathrow. This was in fact a threat to the government’s scheme 
of airport decentralisation for the London area. Yet the idea of route 
transfer itself did look like a step to further competition, and gained support 
of some members in the parliament. Furthermore, BA’s refusal to commit 
itself to the A320 project had already angered some MPs. A series of crises 
in the American air transportation industry, which was high-lighted on 24 
September by Continental Air Lines’ filing for Chapter Eleven of the 
Federal Bankruptcy Law might have been taken as warning against “ laissez 
faire” .41 In UK, demise of airline, or more broadly demise of aviation- 
related organisation, is not a simple failure of business; as that of Laker 
Airways, and later BA’s acquisition of BCal show, bankruptcy of airline is 
more felt as a damage to her national interests.
BCal’s proposal was a genuine surprise to King, who described it as 
“ smash and grab raid” when he announced a £162m half-year profit as 
well as a profit sharing scheme.42 He also stressed that BA was ready to 
compete on any route it would deem profitable. The management of BA 
became so desperate to have the government’s word on its privatisation date 
that Dunlop, the financial director, said: “ the October slot for floating 
British Telecom is dead.”43 The announcements of freezing all domestic 
fares on 23 November, and the introduction of “saver” fares on 1st 
December, which would cut up to 40% in some domestic routes from the 
next April, should be interpreted in this context.44
BCal’s proposal, later to be known as “blue book of BCal” , made 
explicit the government’s dilemma between deregulation and successful 
privatisation. At first Ridley, the transport minister, tried to evade it by 
saying in the parliament that transfer of routes were to be done only by 
agreement between BA and BCal.45 Yet, while the plan to convert BA 
from a government agency to public limited company from April of the 
next year was approved, Ridley had to commission CAA to urgently review 
civil aviation policy.46 The question of route transfer became a central 
issue in the next year.
41 As for Continental’s filing, see Shibata, op. cit., pp. 112-113.
42 Cf. FT 5 Nov., pp. 1, 5. His words quoted in this article show well his anger. On the 
other hand, BA submit to the government an ESOP, employee stock ownership plan, and 
an MBO, management buyout, as possible choices to be made. Cf. FT 7 Nov., p. 32; ST 
6 Nov., p. 53; Times 30 Apr. 1984, p. 1.
43 Quoted in ST 6 Nov., p. 53.
44 Cf. Times 24 Nov., p. 3; FT 24 Nov., p. 8; Times 2 Dec., p. 3.
45 Cf. FT 15 Nov., p. 15; Times 15 Nov., p. 4.




























































































III. 1984: Opposition to Route Transfer
1983 was a good year for the international air transportation industry. The 
growth of traffic continued to 1984. As BA had already succeeded in cost 
reduction, the company posted a series of record profits. However, the more 
it became profitable, the bigger the concerns of other British air carriers, 
who were afraid of being overwhelmed by a privatised BA. They argued 
that BA, if privatised without some trimming, would be too formidable a 
rival to compete with, and that the government should transfer a part of its 
routes to independent carriers to secure a competitive environment. Their 
argument was strengthened by CAA, who proposed route transfer and 
wanted, as its own preparation for an era of deregulation, more power in 
economic regulation of airlines’ behaviour. Led by King and Marshall, BA 
fiercely fought against these proposals, and carried the day. Indeed many 
decisions and actions taken in 1984 by BA, other carriers, and the 
government, were more or less related to the issue of route transfer, and 
therefore, to the issue of privatisation. This chapter deals with, first, 
preparatory steps taken by BA toward privatisation, then the controversy on 
route transfer, and lastly, fare alterations for domestic, European, and 
transatlantic destinations.
1. Preparatory Steps Toward Privatisation
As stated in the previous chapter, King was in favour of flotation in autumn 
1984, but the government decided to privatise British Telecom first. There 
was no question that BA was next in line, but guesses as to the date ranged 
from February to March 1985. As the government never specified the 
date,1 the reasons why this period of the year was chosen remain uncertain. 
Generally the capital markets are not very buoyant in these months, when 
institutional investors tend to be on selling side, in preparation of making 
reports on their investment performance. Probably the government, the sole 
shareholder of BA since April, needed to report gains for itself. The timing 
also would suit BA, having adopted an April-March fiscal regime. Or the 
capital market, it might have been thought, would be ready to digest BA 
shares half a year beyond BT flotation. 1
1 It was only referred to as “ early in 1985” . Cf. Department of Transport, Airline 




























































































The management tried to introduce cost controls in two aspects: labour 
costs and the pension scheme. The pay deal the management offered was 
to cover two years, worth 4% in the first year with a minimum rise of £6 
and 5% in the second. On the other hand, King had already announced in 
the previous November a profit sharing scheme, under which the employees 
would be rewarded a bonus equal to a week’s pay for each £50m of 
operating surplus made by the company over £150m.
There were several bargaining bodies in BA on behalf of employees: 
technical engineering staff, engineering and maintenance staff (6,700), 
engineering and technical supervisors (1,750), clerical and administrative 
staff (10,000), pilots (2,400), ground service staff (4,800), flight attendants 
(430), and cabin crew (4,500), which was composed of long-haul cabin 
crew (2,800) and short-haul branch (1,700). All employees were proposed 
the same offer.
On 9 January, engineering and maintenance staff rejected the offer and 
demanded a higher one-year offer, and went on strike for two hours on 16 
January, again for twenty-four hours on 31 January, which caused 
cancellation of nine long-haul flights from Heathrow. The cabin crew, who 
were all members of the Transport and General Workers Union, a national 
labour organisation, also turned down the offer on 17 February, on the 
grounds that their pay was among the lowest in the industry. A week later, 
they went on strike for twenty-four hours, grounding more than 90% of 
flights from Heathrow. Engineering and technical supervisors also rejected 
the offer at first, but did not take any serious action. The remaining groups 
accepted.
The management took a hard stance. For example, Howard Phelps, 
director of operations division, warned cabin crews of suspension of 
payment up to a month, withdrawal for twelve months of travel concessions 
(90% discount) and loss of shop stewards’ rights. In March, both groups 
lifted the threat of strike and accepted the original offer.
Obviously, the aim of the two-year deal was to leave no uncertainty 
about labour cost for the coming period of privatisation. A further step was 
taken in June when the management withdrew a management directive, 
known as Group Instruction 64, that no engineering work should be put out 
on subcontract without the engineering and maintenance staff union’s 
approval. At first the union protested with a threat to black any planes or 
parts sub-contracted without their consent, but agreed to it once their 
consultative role was reaffirmed.2 *The management also tried, though
2 The dispute arose when an order for refurbishment for BA’s twenty-eight B747s was
reported to go overseas. After the settlement, a £10m order for new galley units was




























































































failed, to introduce part-time cabin staff and short-time contract for some 
full-timers.
The pension scheme of BA had been frequently referred to as a major 
hurdle, alongside its debt, to be cleared before privatisation, since it was 
fully indexed to the inflation rate. The latest actuarial valuation of the funds 
at 30 September 1982 was £2,37 lm for current, deferred and prospective 
liabilities, representing an average annual increase rate of 6.2% from three 
years earlier. The employees’ rates of contribution, which were different 
from one job category to another, and by sex, ranged between 7.0% to 
8.5% of their salaries.3 Contributions made by the company averaged 2.3 
times employees’ contributions as of 1983-84 period. Reflecting the 
decrease in manpower, the company’s contributions were in downward 
trend: £72.4m in 1981-82, £66.9m in 1982-83, and £59.9m in 1983-84.4
However, once privatised, BA would be obliged to fill any deficits in 
case the current asset of the fund was over-estimated. This meant, from the 
government’s point of view, the proceeds of the sale would be reduced by 
an uncertain amount. From prospective investors’ point of view, it meant 
an equally uncertain portion of their investment would be transferred to an 
account that contributed nothing to the company’s finance. Finally, from the 
management’s point of view, an arrangement that was linked to the Retail 
Price Index bound the company to honour an un-negotiable bill of inflation 
every three years.
Dunlop, the financial director, who started reviewing the scheme in 1982, 
gave new pension proposals on 25 January to the company’s sixteen unions 
and to the twelve trustees of the pension fund. Under the new scheme, 
pensions were to be protected against inflation only up to a 5% rise, and 
benefits would include the basic state pension instead of being in addition 
to it.5 On the other hand, the new scheme offered a two per cent reduction 
in contribution levels and, if opted, longer pensionable service. The 
employees were offered three choices: either to remain with the old scheme, 
to switch to the new scheme, or to take a lump sum cash in switching to 
the new scheme but without longer periods of service.
HongKong Aircraft Engineering Co. Cf. FT 10 Apr., p. 9, 21 June, p. 14, 2 Aug., p. 4, 
3 Aug., p. 7.
3 The scheme did not apply to local staff overseas, and covered some 32,000 UK staff, 
including those of some subsidiaries. BA had 19,000 pensioners. Cf. FT 23 Jan., p. 4.
4 The figures are for the BA group, including overseas staff. Afterward, they increased 
to £62m in 1984-85, £67 in 1985-86, and £73m in 1986-87. Cf. BA, Reports and 
Accounts, 1981-82, 1982-83, 1983-84, 1984-85, 1985-86, 1986-87.




























































































BA appointed Hogg Robinson Benefit Consultants as advisor to 
employees, who promoted an extensive campaign of presentations. When 
the deadline came at the end of June, BA announced that 17,000 out of 
32,000 had opted to change. The cash payment, a strong inducement, to 
those who had opted was estimated to be around £80m. Seemingly no union 
took serious action against the new scheme. This sum can very well be 
regarded, together with lost revenues caused by strikes over the pay matters, 
as a cost to reduce uncertainty in payroll.6
In parallel, a number of agents were appointed for flotation preparations. 
One noticeable feature of these appointments is that BA and the Department 
of Transportation (DoT) chose their own teams quite independently. 
Already, Lazard Brothers had been appointed as merchant bank advisor. In 
March, BA named Rowe & Pitman and Phillips & Drew as stockbrokers. 
They made no secret about their intention to look for institutional 
investors.7 On the other hand, the DoT had appointed Hill Samuel as its 
own merchant bank advisor for BA’s flotation. In February Hill Samuel 
started formal procedures to select stockbrokers, which led to the 
appointment by DoT of Wood Mackenzie and Cazenove two months later.8 
In June, DoT appointed Valin Pollen to handle public relations for the 
privatisation, while BA had its own PR subcontractor, Shandwick.9 
Obviously King wanted his own advisors and agents.10 During the 
controversy over route transfer, he often cited Lazard as the City’s opinion 
that the implementation of CAA proposal would seriously hamper and delay 
the privatisation.
6 “ As a commercial enterprise, British Airways has to earn sufficient profits to service 
its debt and capital. Cost control is therefore important and the elimination of uncertain 
costs such as those relating to pensions is essential.” FT 26 Jan., p. 44.
7 Cf. FT 9 Mar., p. 8.
8 Cf. FT 5 May, p. 6.
9 Cf. Times 2 June, p. 21.
10 It might be worthwhile to note that the sale of IAM, handled by S.G.Warburg, was 





























































































In reviewing civil aviation policy, CAA invited any interested parties to 
submit suggestions and comments. More than one hundred airlines, travel 
and consumer groups addressed various proposals."
Roy Watts, who left the company the previous year, claimed the national 
interest of Britain would best be served by a single strong international 
carrier, rather a minority opinion and to which the Federation of Air 
Transport User Representatives in the European Community objected.1 2 
The Air Transport Users Committee, a statutory body, urged a slimming 
down of BA.13 Britannia Airways, the country’s biggest charter holiday 
airline and a part of the Thomson Travel Group, argued that BA should 
withdraw from the whole-plane charter business and should spin off British 
Airtours before privatisation.14 Orion Airways of Horizon Travel and Air 
Europe of Intasun Leisure Group, who were also charter airlines, joined this 
view.15 BCal itself sought flotation, declared itself ready to spend £250m 
for route transfer, and then urged delay of BA’s privatisation.16 The routes 
BCal wanted to take over were revealed at the end of June.17 Air UK and 
BMA argued that BA should withdraw from all its domestic routes except 
shuttle services between Heathrow and Glasgow, Edinburgh, Manchester
2. Controversy over Route Transfer
11 Cf. CAA, Civil Aviation Policy Review, CAP500, 1984, Appendix 2, pp. 28-29. It is 
no wonder that few supported the idea to privatise BA untouched. Colin Marshall 
regarded the rivals’ attitude “ like vultures waiting to swoop.”  Cf. FT 12 Mar., p. 5.
12 Cf. DT 31 Jan., p. 7.
13 Cf. FT 10 Feb., p. 6.
14 Cf. FT 20 Feb., p. 5.
15 The three airlines formed a joint body, the Airport Users’ Study Group, which in turn 
claimed BA subsidiaries were conducting dumping, and urged that CAA should be given 
power against monopolistic exercise. British Airtours was the second largest charter 
operator in UK and, perhaps owing to lower equipment purchase costs, was highly 
profitable and able to undercut rivals’ prices. In August, Air Europe was forced to slim 
down operations because its parent gave a contract to British Airtours. Cf. Times 9 Mar., 
p. 3, 31 May, p. 21, 11 July, p. 21, 12 July, p. 23; FT 24 May, p. 10, 31 May, p. 10; 
ST 19 Aug., p. 45.
16 Cf. Times 20 Mar., p. 3; FT 12 Apr., p. 11; Times 1 May, p. 19; FT 1 May, p. 44.
17 They were from Heathrow to the Caribbean, Japan, China, Seoul, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, 
Istanbul, Cyprus, Athens, Malta, Vienna and Helsinki, and from Gatwick to the Iberian 




























































































and Belfast.18 BA submitted its own comment on February 1st, stressing, 
among other things, that route transfer would not promote competition but 
seriously hamper its privatisation scheme,19 all the while posting a net 
profit of £214m for 1983-84 and becoming one of the most profitable 
airlines in the world.
On 16 July, CAA published its view and sent it to the government. The 
report, Civil Aviation Policy Review (CAP500), was composed of five main 
recommendations.20 First, it recommended to transfer to the independents 
BA’s routes between continental Europe and domestic regional airports 
(Gatwick, Aberdeen, Belfast, Birmingham, Edinburgh, Glasgow and 
Manchester). Second, transfer BA’s routes between Fleathrow to Hahare 
(Zimbabwe), Dhahran and Jeddah to BCal. Third, increase the proposed 
limit of slots at Heathrow that had been set in connection to the 
construction of Terminal Four. Fourth, increase of direct competition on 
domestic routes through abolition of licensing about fares and entry, except 
in the case of Heathrow and Gatwick. Fifth, increase CAA’s own regulatory 
powers to prevent BA from abusing its strength in charter markets, while 
rejecting the idea of hiving off British Airtours. Concerning the first and 
second points, CAA urged the government to take legislative measures.
Of course, CAA was acutely aware that transfer of international routes 
did not lead to an increase of competition. Competition, especially price 
competition, can only take place in the same market. In air transportation 
economics, a market means a pair of cities, i.e., a route. If BCal took over 
an international route from BA, it simply meant a replacement of a player 
by another in a duopoly game, in which the foreign airline, the counterpart, 
most usually operated based on a pooling agreement. If BCal wanted a new 
fare that was unacceptable to its counterpart, the foreign government would 
simply reject the proposal. In this regard, BA’s argument was legitimate 
that route transfer would not increase competition and that it would 
welcome competition under dual (or multiple) designations. However, 
CAA’s main intention was to create the “second force” airline that the 
Edwards Committee proposed in 1969 before the merger of BOAC and 
BEA.21 *The Authority maintained that the transfer would have an effect
18 Cf. FT 23 May, p. 7.
19 Cf. FT 2 Feb., p. 7.
20 CAA, op. cit., p. 21.
21 British Air Transport in the Seventies, Cmnd. 4018. Cf. FT 28 Feb., p. 18; ST 8 July,
p. 53. As for a brief review of the Edwards report and subsequent CAA policy, cf. ST




























































































to reduce BA’s scheduled service revenue by around 1% and thus would 
not hamper its privatisation.
BA countered CAA in announcing its own estimate that a full 
implementation of CAA proposals would result in a loss of £300m in 
annual revenue (more than double the CAA estimate), £76m in profits, and 
a further redundancy of 3,600 employees. Then BA would, King stressed, 
need to create a new track record of profitability, and added: “ Any 
privatisation would be put back by four years or more -  beyond the life of 
this Government.”22
Indeed this was his most powerful weapon during the ensuing months of 
intensive lobbying. When John Dent, CAA chairman, criticised BA’s over­
reaction, the company responded vehemently that “any postponement of 
privatisation or reduction in the price that may be obtained would arise only 
from the threat to BA contained in the CAA review.”23 On the other hand, 
Jim Harris, BA’s director of marketing, suggested an entire withdrawal 
from Manchester airport if BA’s European routes from the airport were 
transferred, threatening a loss of 1,000 local jobs.24
Of course the independents also launched an extensive campaign as well 
as lobbying. Eight of them appealed directly to the prime minister.25
The government was split. Ridley and George Younger, Scottish 
secretary, supported CAA proposals, while Norman Tebbit, Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry, a former BOAC pilot and a friend of Roy 
Watts, and Nigel Lawson, Chancellor of the Exchequer, supported the idea 
of privatising BA unhampered. The government was not able to produce its 
own view in response to the last rise of the Commons before summer 
recess, and set up a cabinet committee.26 The next cabinet meeting was to 
be held on 13 September. Then, a hot summer started.
BCal had already applied for a wide range of new routes immediately 
after the CAA review was published.27 BMA and Air UK followed suit for
22 Quoted in FT 20 July, p. 5.
23 Times 25 July, p. 2; FT 25 July, p. 5.
24 Cf. FT 27 July, p. 7.
25 Namely BCal, BMA, Air UK, Dan Air, Air Europe, Britannia, Monarch and Orion. 
Cf. Times 2 Aug., p. 3; FT 2 Aug., p. 4.
26 For the debates in the Commons on 30 July, cf. FT 31 July, p. 12; Times 31 July, p. 
4. As for the composition of the cabinet committee, cf. ST 12 Aug., p. 14; FT 3 Aug.,
p. 6.




























































































fifteen European routes from Birmingham and Manchester.28 Air Europe 
proposed to take over BA’s Iberian services from Gatwick.29 BMA wanted 
to establish a hub at Birmingham and applied for domestic and European 
routes serviced by BA from the airport.30
BA, while lobbying aggressively, declared it would not object to BCal’s 
applications to CAA and would welcome the competition.31 On 5 
September, Marshall, at the occasion of announcing a record operating 
profit for the first quarter, proposed to share twelve international routes with 
BCal on a fixed capacity ratio (80% to 90% for BA).32
On the other hand, the management made it clear that if ordered a route 
transfer, it would not obey the government, so that the government would 
be obliged to dismiss the board members.33 Furthermore King reminded 
everyone that the government had given promises of “no arbitrary transfer” 
before privatisation.34
The cabinet deferred decision, primarily due to failure to find a 
compromise. While Ridley tried to work out one behind the scene, a new 
limit was set for 5 October, the last cabinet meeting before the Conservative 
Party conference. The final result was a surprisingly self-contradictory 
statement of policy, published on 5 October.35
In this white paper, the objectives of airline policy were “ to encourage 
a sound and competitive multi-airline industry...strong enough to compete 
aggressively against foreign airlines...; to promote competition in all 
markets...; to ensure adequate safeguards against anti-competitive or
8 Cf. Times 8 Aug., p. 3; FT 8 Aug., p. 6.
29 Cf. Times 13 Aug., p. 3; FT 14 Aug., p. 6.
30 Cf. FT 22 Aug., p. 8.
31 Cf. ST 5 Aug., p. 45, 12 Aug., p. 2; Times 13 Aug., p. 3; FT 13 Aug., p. 3.
32 BCal rejected the proposal. Cf. FT 6 Sept., p. 44; Times 6 Sept., p. 2, 10 Sept., p. 1.
33 Cf. Times 10 Sept., p. 1.
34 Cf. Times 10 Sept., p. 12. It is also likely that he himself had promised the employees 
no further redundancy. Cf. ST 16 Sept., p. 57; Ashworth and Forsyth, op. cit., p. 109.
35 Department of Transport, Airline Competition Policy, Cmnd. 9366, HMSO, 1984. For 
a brief appraisal, see John Vickers and George Yarrow, Privatization: An Economic 





























































































predatory behaviour...; to put the ownership of British Airways into the 
hands of private investors...”36 But the decisions stood in sharp contrast.
First, “ [t]he Government has decided that there will be no forced 
reduction in British Airways’ size relative to the rest of the industry”37 
because “ [uncertainty affecting the privatisation of British Airways must 
be resolved”38 and, after all, “ the independents have grown despite British 
Airways and should continue to be able to grow given fair competition” .39 
On the other hand, BA was to help the independents other than BCal in 
providing up to £450,000 for each of 15 new route developments 
undertaken by them from regional airports, which was a de facto subsidy 
to its rivals.40 BA’s route transfer would not take place. “The Government 
has received strong representations from local authorities and other interests 
that British Airways should retain its regional presence”41 and admitted 
“ a risk that without the major airline operating from Manchester and 
Birmingham both airports would become less attractive.”42
Second, the competition must be cautiously promoted because “ on some 
routes for example, both domestic and international, demand is probably too 
low at present to support more than one British carrier.”43 And “ the best 
prospects for introducing extra competition lie in the short haul routes to 
continental Europe...”44 since “ [tjraffic on many of the short haul routes 
is sufficient to support competing British airlines.”45 Clearly the text omits 
the possibility of an increase in traffic to be generated by price-competition. 
Under competition, airlines struggle to maintain, or increase, their 
profitability out of lower yield (revenue per passenger distance carried)
36 Ibid., para. 4.
37 Ibid., para. 15.
38 Ibid., para. 14.
39 Ibid., para. 15.
40 Ibid., para. 20. CAA held hearings from October to November 1985, and allocated 
routes by January 1986. The assistance by BA did not necessarily take the form of 
money, as technical co-operation substituted for it. Cf. FT 23 Sept. 1985, p. 8, 23 Jan. 
1986, p. 8.
41 Ibid., para. 19.
42 Ibid., para. 20.
43 Ibid., para. 8.





























































































through cost-cutting and larger traffic volume. If deregulation means where, 
when and how to generate traffic or to snatch rivals’ share are largely or 
completely at operators’ discretion and risk, the above argument is, to say 
least, very paternalistic.
Third, the government “strongly endorses the Authority’s proposal to 
introduce an area licensing facility...between any two points in the UK 
[excluding Heathrow and Gatwick],...also welcomes the Authority’s 
proposal that domestic fares should no longer require specific approval” ,46 
while refusing to give CAA powers against anti-competitive or predatory 
behaviour on the grounds that “the Authority can attach appropriate 
conditions to an air transport license...and refuse lower prices” .47 Instead, 
the Office of Fair Trading and Monopolies and Mergers Commissions were 
endorsed to handle anti-competitive behaviour.
Probably the whole affair was an inter-ministerial power struggle between 
CAA and DoT over air transportation policy, judging from a bold statement 
that “ [ajfter very careful consideration the Government has concluded it is 
unnecessary for the Authority to be given a duty to promote the sound 
development of a competitive British airline industry.”48
If CAA was the loser, BA was undoubtedly the winner. Route transfer 
was wholly rejected. Instead, a deal of swapping some routes between BA 
and BCal was forged. BA would hand over Jeddah and Dhahran in 
exchange with BCal’s routes to South America. In addition, BCal would 
surrender licenses to Denver and Morocco, and would not oppose BA’s 
application for Orlando and Tampa.49 BA was allowed to move its Iberian 
services from Gatwick to Heathrow.50 It is no wonder, for example, that 
Dan Air’s chairman fiercely criticised the white paper.51 It is also curious 
why BCal did not show discontent. Probably Thomson was glad to take 
over the routes to Saudi Arabia, so lucrative as to be nicknamed the 
“bankers’ route” , in exchange for the South American network that had 
been severely damaged due to the Falklands War.
46 Ibid., para. 26.
47 Ibid., para. 28.
48 Ibid., para. 31. See also ST 7 Oct., p. 57. In this regard, Ridley’s position must have 
been a delicate one. He described the paper a result of “practical politics” . Cf. FT 6 
O ct, p. 1.
49 Cf. ibid., para. 23.
50 Ibid., para. 18. One should note that Iberia and Air Portugal were operating from 
Heathrow and BA had been complaining about it. Cf. FT 4 Mar. 1983, p. 7.




























































































The talk between BA and BCal began five days after the White Paper 
was published, and two weeks later agreement was reached to take over 
each other’s routes from March 31 of the next year.52
The tactics employed by the BA management throughout this crucial con­
troversy were widely ranged, from persuasion, appeasement to open threat. 
Apart from lobbying and persuading ministers and MPs, it threatened an 
entire withdrawal from regional airports and secured their support against 
route transfer; it made clear the intention to defy an order for route transfer 
with a threat of industrial action by its unions, together with a threat to 
blow up the prospect of privatisation if management changed. Also, it was, 
as we shall see in the following sections of this chapter, active in promoting 
lower fares, or at least, cautious not to appear as opposed to lower fares, 
both domestically and internationally. Furthermore, decisions and 
declarations on purchase of aircraft seem to have been politically steered.
As early as January, BA showed a renewed interest in the A320. King 
met Bernard Lathiere in London, president of Airbus Industrie, and paid a 
visit to the constructor’s headquarters at Toulouse in March.53 Besides 
Airbus, BA ordered three BAe (British Aerospace) Super 748s for £9m on 
10 May.54 Then on 14 September, the day after the cabinet deferred its 
decision over the air transfer row, BA formally declared its interest in the 
A320.55 Three days later, King gave a personal endorsement to another 
British-made aircraft, BAe 146, but did not forget to add that the aircraft 
would be used on its European routes so that route transfer would affect the 
final decision adversely.56 No doubt all these aircraft were economical, 
quiet, and advanced; but it is equally true that these announcements were 
carefully timed.
As the White Paper admits, regional interests were strongly against route 
transfer. Manchester International airport opposed the replacement.57 The 
British Chamber of Commerce and Industry stood on the side of the 
regional airports.58 West Midlands Council, the owner of Birmingham
52 Cf. ibid., 2 Nov., p. 9; Times 31 O ct, p. 3.
53 Cf. Times 12 Jan., p. 1, 26 Mar., p. 17.
54 Cf. Times 11 May, p. 2.
55 Cf. Times 15 Sept., p. 1. BA currently possesses ten A320s, originally ordered by 
BCal.
56 Cf. FT 18 Sept., p. 7; Times 18 Sept., p. 3.
57 Cf. FT 12 Sept., p. 10.




























































































airport, opposed the transfer of BA’s services from the airport and stated 
typically: “ ...British Airways as the national flag carrier does carry a major 
prestige factor for the airport, and we strongly believe that as in other 
European countries, the flag carrier should be operating from major regional
. , ,  50airports.
In addition to practical concern about loss of jobs resulting from 
withdrawal by BA, we find here reflection of two particular assumptions. 
The first is that status of an airport or the region is affected by having or 
losing the national flag carrier’s service. This is rooted in the second 
assumption of national flag carrier. Certainly it is wrong to think that BA 
was not Britain’s national flag carrier. But it would also be an obsolescent 
belief that a country should possess a national flag carrier. If international 
air transportation deregulation means lower fares and intensive competition 
through dual or multiple designation (or through no designation process at 
all), any government who wishes to obtain political gains out of its 
implementation should necessarily be prepared to have as many competent 
airlines as possible.
If so, this also suggests an explanation as to why the deregulation of 
international air transportation has been particularly upheld by such 
countries as the U.S. and UK. Deregulation of domestic air transport gives 
rise to venture-minded operators, who, as new entrants, are necessarily 
prepared to offer cheaper fares. On the other hand, the highly standardised 
operational procedures and technical requirements in the field of aviation 
make them, almost from the outset, able to operate on international routes, 
especially to nearby destinations. Needless to say, possession of this new 
breed of airlines is a prerequisite for a government that wishes to gain some 
possibly political advantages in pursuing the policy of international 
deregulation. In Europe, the UK and the Netherlands were the earliest to 
develop multi-airline industries, out of which they could afford to become 
“ liberal” .60
To put it otherwise, “ the” national flag carrier in the sense of “chosen 
instrument” was being outmoded, at least for the industrialised countries 
where consumers cried out for cheaper air transport.61 The Civil
59 Quoted in FT 23 Aug., p. 5.
60 In the late 1980s, Europe saw about one hundred airlines newly created. A large part 
of them were in the “ liberal” countries. Cf. International Civil Aviation Organisation, 
The Economic Situation o f Air Transport, Review and Outlook: 1978 to the Year 2000, 
1989, p. 6 Table 2-2, as quoted in Gil, op. cit., p. 322 note 8.
61 Marvin Cohen, chairman of CAB and faithful successor of Alfred Kahn, admits that 




























































































Aeronautics Board, if not the US government, was clearly aware of this 
implication of deregulation, when it refused Pan Am permission to take 
over bankrupt Braniff’s Latin American routes in 1982. The other 
governments were slow to realise the change. Also, the government of the 
People’s Republic of China still regarded Pan Am as the national flag 
carrier of the U.S., and protested to Washington as Pan Am resumed its 
Taipei service in June 1983, while allowing Northwest Airlines to serve 
both countries across the Taiwan Strait.62 As the posterior course of 
events showed, the U.S. could do without Pan Am, essentially because it 
had many other pawns in hand that became competitive out of fierce 
domestic struggles. In fact, the U.S. had, and still has, more competent 
airlines than any other country. Therefore, the need for a “ second force” 
airline arose not only from the concern for consumers, but also from the 
sheer necessity of, say, national interest.
3. Domestic Competition
London-Edinburgh and London-Belfast routes were the main field of 
competition that year. Also, BA announced an expansion plan from 
Manchester to foreign destinations. In all cases, BA at first responded 
selectively to BMA’s challenges, and then used its muscles.
In December 1983, BCal announced a weekend return fare of £60, 
instead of the normal £118, for Gatwick-Edinburgh flights. BMA brought 
down its Heathrow-Edinburgh return fare to £74, effective from 1st April. 
BA responded by introducing a £58 return for a two-month trial from 6 
February on off-peak flights on weekdays and all weekend flights, bookable 
fourteen days in advance, and valid up to a month. The competition was 
limited to off-peak discounts, aiming at the holiday traveller segment.63 64
The idea was later extended to other shuttle services for the summer
f tdseason.
Can Airline Deregulation Work in International Air Transportation?, Flight 
Transportation Laboratory Report M80-1, Department of Aeronautics & Astronautics, 
MIT, 1980, p. 37.
62 Cf. Kyohei Shibata, “ Koku-kisei-kanwa-ka no Pan Am [Pan Am under 
Deregulation]” , Journal o f Economic Review no.25, Faculty of Economics, Shinshu 
University, Matsumoto, Japan, 1986, pp. 49-72.
63 Cf. Times 5 Jan., p. 2.




























































































The Heathrow-Belfast route became the theatre of full-scale price 
competition. BMA started the service on 25 March, with an introductory 
fare of £29 single for off-peak flights and £37 for peak ones, applicable 
until the end of April. As soon as these fares were announced, BA quickly 
matched them and set identical fares.65 Dan Air, flying between Gatwick 
and Belfast, did the same.66
In August BMA introduced a £99 day return fare for its services from 
Heathrow to Belfast, Edinburgh and Glasgow, then initiated a frequent flier 
programme.67 In October BA applied to CAA for an increase, effective 
from November, while keeping its excursion fare at £95, and later declared 
its intent to freeze domestic fares the following year.68
As for international services from regional airports, BMA applied to take 
over New York service from Manchester and Prestwick, of which BA and 
BCal had not used their licenses. Air Europe won a license to fly scheduled 
services between Gatwick and Palma (Majorca), while BA had ceased 
operation between Heathrow and Palma some time previously.69 In 
defense, BA announced a “major expansion” plan from Manchester to 
overseas destinations in November.70
4. European Routes
The British government was eager to bring down European fares. It 
repeatedly advocated at various levels of the EC that “Fortress Europe” , 
i.e., the European “air cartel”, should be put to an end in light of the 
Treaty of Rome. In 1984, the first success was scored.
On 4 May, David Mitchell, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for 
Transport, reached agreement with the Dutch government to end the pool 
system between BA and KLM. Six days later, BA announced a £49 return
6' Cf. Times 13 Mar., p. 2; FT 15 Mar., p. 8.
66 Cf. Times 26 Mar., p. 2.
67 Cf. Times 21 Aug., p. 2; FT 21 Aug., p. 5.
68 Cf. FT 18 Oct., p. 5, 6 Dec., p. 7.
69 Cf. FT 9 July, p. 6.
70 Cf. FT 2 Nov., p. 9. The planned destinations were New York, Munich, Lamaca 




























































































) fare from Heathrow to Schipol, effective from July.71 BCal followed suit 
in bringing down its fare to the same level for Gatwick-Schipol, and Air 
UK for Stansted-Schipol. Virgin Atlantic, which was due to start 
transatlantic service from June, applied for the Gatwick-Maastricht route at 
£20 single.72
The news was much hailed by newspapers. Ridley declared triumphantly 
at the Council of Ministers that UK airlines were no longer bound to 
consult their opposite numbers on fare changes before asking the British 
government’s approval.73 *If BA was not bound, it did consult KLM to set 
up the fare as well as its restrictive conditions. Tickets were to be 
purchased in advance, seats were to be requested only the day before 
departure, and ticket-holders were to spend a certain period of time before 
returning. The same fare proposed by BCal was available on one flight each 
way a day, but bookable.
The Dutch government refused the proposal by BCal on grounds of 
unfair competition, and requested a uniform package. After hasty 
negotiations for about three weeks, a new agreement was signed on 20 
June, which liberalised fares, routes and capacity of air transportation 
between the two countries. The most notable feature of the agreement was 
the “ sixth freedom” , allowing airlines to carry passengers originating from 
the other country to a third country via the home country on a single
71 The return fare for Club class, BA’s brand for business class, was then £156, 
Eurobudget £132, and APEX, the cheapest, £87. The £49 fare was branded “ Latesaver” . 
Cf. FT 8 May, pp. 1, 36, 11 May, pp. 2,11; Times 11 May, p. 1.
72 The service by Virgin Atlantic on this route started on 15 Nov. During the first three 
weeks the fare was £16, to be raised to £25 afterwards. Cf. Times 26 Oct., p. 1.
73 Cf. FT 12 May, p. 17; The Economist 19 May, p. 16. However, it should be stressed
here that the Dutch government was one of the first European governments, along with
the Belgian, that had concluded a liberal air services agreement with the U.S. in the late 
1970s. The British government found the Dutch attitude damaging to their negotiation
for Bermuda n. Cf. Christer Joensson, International Aviation and the Politics o f Regime 
Change, Frances Pinter, 1987, p. 124; Alan P. Dobson, Peaceful Air Warfare: The 





























































































flight.74 As this freedom was requested by the Dutch government, there 
was a fear in Britain of losing traffic.75
This freedom is, however, essential to develop international hub-and- 
spoke operations, especially in such a multi-national and comparatively 
small region as Europe. Deregulation in this regard would trigger 
competition not only between airlines, but also between airports to become 
important hubs, hence, between national governments to provide their 
airports with competitive capacity to handle traffic.76 In this competition, 
geographical elements may play an important, perhaps decisive, role, itself 
an interesting topic but beyond the scope of the present paper.
BA continued to introduce lower fares for continental flights: German 
destinations, French provincial destinations, Swiss cities, Budapest, were all 
made accessible at cheaper rates. Yet, in every case BA worked closely 
with its counterpart airlines, namely Lufthansa, Air France, Swissair and 
Malev, in devising fares and restrictions.77 *In most cases, travellers were 
required to book a fortnight in advance and spend a weekend before 
returning. These restrictions were designed to be unattractive, or unpractical, 
to the business traveller segment, while BCal found it extremely difficult 
to set unrestricted fares. In Europe, lower fares were being introduced, but 
very much in a concerted way between the flag carriers, who were anxious 
to fill seats unsold to business travellers. The independents could not crack 
the cartel yet.
74 Cf. ibid., p. 33. As for the consequence and evaluation of the Anglo-Dutch air service 
agreement, see Francis McGowan and Chris Trengove, European Aviation: A Common 
Market?, IFS Report Series no.23, The Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1986, pp. 138-150. 
For other bilateral agreements liberalised by UK, see Button and Swann in Button (ed.), 
op. cit., pp. 94-95, also Paul Stephen Dempsey, “ Aerial Dogfights over Europe: The 
Liberalization of EEC Air Transport” , Journal o f Air Imw  and Commerce, vol. 53, no. 
3, 1988, pp. 630-634.
75 Cf. Times 8 June, p. 2; FT 22 June, p. 8; The Economist 30 June, p. 18. Cooperation 
between the Dutch government and KLM, “ the flying Dutchman” , is often close and 
effective. For another example, see Thornton, op. cit., pp. 98-99.
76 For hub-and-spoke operation, see, for example, Donald Pickrell, “ The Regulation and 
Deregulation of US Airlines” , as chap. 2 of Button (ed.), op. cit., pp. 21-23.
77 For German flights and the difficulties encountered by BCal, cf. ST 29 July, p. 1;
Times 4 Aug., p. 3, 19 Sept., p. 3; FT 27 Sept., p. 6, 9 Oct., p. 9. For French ones, cf.
Times 31 Aug., p. 3; FT 31 Aug., p. 5. For Swiss, cf. Times 7 Sept., p. 3; FT 1 Sept.,




























































































weekend before returning, and no refund was available. The return fare for 
Heathrow-JFK was £259 instead of £299 in the previous year.79
On 30 August, Richard Branson, president of Virgin Atlantic, asserted 
that the Super Apex fare to New York was “predatory” and suggested 
legal action in the U.S. The price differential was £1 for return. Given the 
deep cuts that BA was introducing on other American routes, it is difficult 
to judge the £259 fare as specifically designed to get Virgin Atlantic out of 
business. Despite the popularity it gained, it was then a tiny airline with 
only one leased B747. North Atlantic business was buoyant while the 
breakeven load factor for BA was merely 54.8% for 1983-84. Having 
posted a half-year net profit surpassing that of the whole previous year, BA 
had no express need to cut Virgin Atlantic’s throat. It is more likely that 
BA’s intention was to cover the budget traveller segment, which the “point- 
to-point” airlines were appealing to. As the restrictions suggest, it was for 
BA a question of filling unsold seats. But for Virgin Atlantic, which needed 
a 70% load factor to attain breakeven, a large enough price differential was 
essential.
This suggests that upstarts are easily pushed to the wall if big airlines 
introduce fares close enough to theirs.80 Added to this, small scale airlines 
have a peculiar disadvantage. Their narrow margin is crucially at the mercy 
of exchange rate fluctuations. In fact, People Express did not change its fare 
in dollar terms ($149), but was forced to raise its price in Britain due to the 
weak pound. In contrast, BA could afford to shield itself through a large 
amount of forward transactions.81
Branson’s claim hit a sensitive diplomatic nerve. In the previous June the 
U.S. Justice Department started a criminal anti-trust investigation on 
possible conspiracy to drive Laker out of business, which the liquidator of 
the bust airline alleged in US civil court. In this litigation BA, among 
others, was on defensive against a $1.05 billion claim. The official view of 
Britain was that the prices agreed upon among airlines and approved by the 
both governments under Bermuda II were exempt from US internal law.
79 Other reductions were: Heathrow to Boston for £239 from £299, to Washington £284 
from £340, and Philadelphia £274 from £334. Cf. FT 18 July, p. 9; Times 27 July, p. 
3.
80 This tactics also proved effective in US. In 1984 People Express started service to 
Florida, mainstay market for Eastern Air Lines. Eastern succeeded to keep its share with 
a few dollars on top of People’s fares. Cf. Shibata (1988), op. cit., p. 124.
81 Cf. note 20 of the previous chapter. Virgin Atlantic may be unique in this aspect, as 






























































































Transatlantic traffic boomed this year, thanks primarily to the strong dollar. 
In 1983, 15 to 16 million people flew between Europe and the U.S.; one 
third of this traffic was between the U.K. and U.S., by far the largest 
volume. BA was the biggest operator, carrying 1.5 million or 10% of the 
North Atlantic traffic, followed by TWA with 1.0 million. As on the 
European routes, BA collaborated with TWA and Pan Am, its American 
counterparts, in devising lower fares and restrictions. Virgin Atlantic, a new 
entrant, branded them as “predatory” .
In mid-February, British Atlantic Airways applied for the Gatwick- 
Newark route at £99 single, effective from June. While BCal proposed to 
resume service on the route for £50 single from the following April, the 
Virgin Records Group purchased 75% of British Atlantic’s parent company 
and changed the airline’s name to Virgin Atlantic Airways. Virgin Atlantic 
proposed the same £99 fare for an introductory period, £119 from July until 
September 15 with £10 weekend surcharge, and then down again to £110. 
CAA granted the license and certificate. On 24 June the inaugural flight 
took off, and scheduled service began in July.
The main rival of Virgin Atlantic was supposed to be People Express, an 
American upstart which began transatlantic service in May 1983. Due to the 
weakness of sterling, People Express’ fare in sterling went up: £99 at the 
outset, £102 in October 1983, £113 in May 1984, and £122 in August. 
Virgin’s fare was also slated to go up to £129 in November.
On the other hand, BA and other predominant carriers’ cheapest fares 
were on a steady downward trend. For example, BA’s standby fare to New 
York, available only in last minutes before departure, was brought down to 
£170 in July 1984, from £175 a year earlier. In July, BA announced a series 
of deep cuts. The standby fare was further brought down to the level of 
£139.78
In addition to this, BA announced, with Pan Am and TWA, a Super 
Apex return fare for the winter season from November to March. Usual 
restrictions applied: tickets were available for those who booked in the last 
three days before departure, ticket-holders were required to spend a
78 Apart from New York standby fares, Heathrow to Los Angeles or San Francisco was 
brought down to £199 from £230, Washington or Baltimore £159 from £190, 
Philadelphia £149 from £180, Chicago £189 from £210, Detroit £189 from £205, and 




























































































DoT requested assurances from the American government that the fares 
proposed by BA and others would not be prosecuted under anti-trust law. 
Given the independence of Justice, Washington was reluctant to give such 
assurances. Then DoT refused to grant cheap fares on 18 October. A week 
later it announced its intention to charge the difference between the ongoing 
fares and the prices of Super Apex tickets already sold. As 70% of them 
were estimated to be bought in the U.S., some 70,000 travellers might be 
requested to pay at British airports in the most extreme case. Dan 
McKinnon, the last chairman of CAB, threatened retaliation. As the tickets 
were to be used shortly, tension mounted. On 30 October, DoT reversed its 
decision and allowed airlines to honour the tickets sold before they were 
banned.
In early November BA, TWA and Pan Am again applied for the same 
fare, only to be refused on 15 November. Four days later. President Reagan 
ordered the Justice Department to abandon its investigation on the Laker 
case. A month later, both governments agreed to approve lower winter fares 
and the Justice Department declared it would not bring anti-trust action 
against them. Simultaneously, the British government decided to reverse its 
ban. Virgin Atlantic did not resort to legal challenge.
It is obvious that the British government tried to obtain de facto 
guarantees that lower fares agreed upon among airlines and approved would 
not be prosecuted under American law. Although the assurance given by the 
American authorities was of temporary character, the score was clearly 
marked in favour of the British. In this regard, the lower fares proposed by 
BA and threat of court action by Branson were both used to gain a point 
in principle, which is a highly diplomatic issue. Perhaps Reagan was 
anxious to secure British support on strategic matters in Europe. His 
stoppage order to the Justice Department certainly displaced a major hurdle 
for the privatisation of BA, but it should not be regarded as the main aim 
of the British government.
The last topic that needs mentioning is Concorde. The British 
government and BA agreed to write down Concorde assets to nil in 1978- 
79, with an amount of £160m in public dividend capital. Surplus earned on 
Concorde operations were to be divided between them, the government 
receiving 80% and BA retaining 20%. Thanks to losses brought forward, 
such payment had never taken place, despite, for example, an operating 
profit of £11.5m made by Concorde operation for 1983-84.
Since 1983, BA began to employ this unique asset in a promotional 
fashion; inaugural flights of domestic Super shuttle service and its 
anniversary a year after were both commemorated by Concorde. In October 
1983, Marshall declared his intention to extend its Washington service to 




























































































New York flights.82 The next month, the Cunard Steam-Ship Company 
signed a £5.5m contract to charter 130 flights for its round trips to New 
York on Queen Elisabeth II and Concorde, with three nights at the Waldorf 
Astoria Hotel in Manhattan.83
In parallel to the changing status as a public limited company, the profit- 
sharing scheme between the government and BA was scrapped. On the 
other hand, BA bought all spare parts that were owned by the government 
in exchange of cash more than £9 million. Given the overall cost of more 
than £1.5 billion for R&D and construction, Concorde was hardly a 
remunerative project for the government.84 However, it became finally a 
money-spinner for BA.
82 Concorde service to Washington, three times weekly each way, carried 10,000 
passengers per year (load factor around 30%), while New York flights, twice daily each 
way, carried 75,000 (load factor around 50%). The Miami service started in March, 
1984. Cf. Air Transport World, June 1984, pp. 68-70.
83 Afterward, this kind of fancy charter tour became a characteristic of Concorde’s 
operation by BA; the trips by Cunard were enlarged, a flight to New Zealand to view 
Halley’s Comet was undertaken, and a return flight was provided for executives visiting 
a computer exhibition in Hanover. Cf. Times 2 Mar. 1985, p. 3, 29 Oct. 1985, p. 3, 3 
Dec. 1985, p. 18; FT 26 Oct. 1985, p. 1, 18 Jan. 1986, p. 4. Also, Air Transport World, 
Jan. 1986, “ British Airways Concorde now considered flagship of the fleet” , pp. 40-45.
84 For the development and construction of Concorde, see Keith Hayward, The British 




























































































IV. 1985: Toward Expansion
In 1985 BA cleared the last hurdle for privatisation, or so it was thought. 
The litigation concerning the bankruptcy of Laker Airways was settled out 
of court. In the meantime it became increasingly clear that the government’s 
policy differed from one area to another. In domestic air transportation, 
deregulation of air fares took place. In Europe, CAA employed its power 
selectively to promote cheaper fares. In the transatlantic arena, CAA 
actually refused a lower fare in fear of triggering another anti-trust civil suit 
in the U.S. And finally in the Far East, the government showed a clear 
intention to guard BA’s interests.
1. Laker Litigation Settled out of Court
On 24 November 1982, Christopher Morris, senior partner at Touche Ross 
& Co., filed a suit at District Court of Columbia, U.S., alleging as the 
liquidator of Laker Airways Ltd. that a conspiracy by international airlines 
drove Laker Airways out of business. Morris argued that established carriers 
had collectively set low fares on North Atlantic routes during the 1980-81 
winter season to drive Laker Airways bankrupt and, when a rescue plan was 
discussed, acted to make it fail. The amount sought was $1.05 billion as the 
federal anti-trust law tripled the damage.1
Although a civil case it was, the British government claimed that fare­
setting practice, implied in Bermuda II, should be exempt from the 
domestic jurisdiction of the United States. Moreover, its was certainly not 
pleasant to see British companies, including a state-owned one, being sued 
by another British one in American court. From the viewpoint of the U.S., 
however, the Bermuda II was not a treaty ratified by Congress, and the 
British attitude did look like protecting a cartel club. The situation became 
tense in the autumn of 1984, until President Reagan’s instigation to call off 
the Grand Jury investigation of possible criminal offence. Soon thereafter, 
BA began to seek an out-of-court settlement. Interestingly, it seems the 
move was urged by DoT on advice of its merchant bank advisor, Hill 
Samuel.2
1 The defendants were BA, BCal, Pan Am, TWA, Lufthansa, Swissair, Sabena, KLM, 
UTA, SAS, McDonnell Douglas, and McDonnell Douglas Finance Corporation. For the 
analysis of Laker, see Banks, op. cit.




























































































Seemingly there was still a considerable difference between the 
government and the board of BA as to when and how the company was to 
be sold. As late as November 1984, King wanted to float BA by February 
of the next year, with its debt lightened by the injection of public money, 
and offered the government a large portion of the proceeds. The 
government rejected the idea for financial reasons and, more deeply, for 
political reasons as well.3
To put it another way, the difference rested on whether the government 
was to inject money first to make BA attractive, sell it at a higher price, 
and to get money back out of proceeds, or BA would be left to get rid of 
the hurdles in the way to privatisation by its own efforts. Clearly the 
government opted for the latter; when BA became a public limited company 
in April 1984, the government made sure that the company would not com­
mit to aircraft purchases without its consent, because, not only would it 
have decreased the proceeds of BA’s sell-off but also increased the PSBR.
On the other hand, BA set out on a course of expansion that year and the 
management was not happy to see their hands tied in regard to fleet 
decisions. In March, King made his belief public that “ government controls 
over such important aspects of business as pricing policy or investment 
decisions is inconsistent with the freedom of management to act” .4 In July, 
Marshall said that “ [t]he Government has clearly indicated that they do not 
want us to place orders for substantial new equipment before 
privatisation” ,5 presumably referring to the request made by the 
government to seek its approval for all aircraft investment except those 
acquired on short-term leases. Then in September he declared an intention 
to replace and expand BA’s fleet at an annual cost of £550 million over the 
next ten years.6 As B747 had no competing type of aircraft, he was in fact 
referring to a major aircraft order.
Nonetheless, an embarrassing note in the company’s report stating that 
it had been sued for $1.05 billion needed to be addressed, especially if a 
portion of the stock was to be sold to American investors.7 *
3 Cf. FT 3 Jan., p. 10.
4 Quoted in FT 22 Mar., p. 12.
5 Quoted in Times 23 July, p. 5. For the government’s request, cf. FT 6 Aug., p. 6.
6 Cf. FT 25 Sept., p. 11. As another step of expansion, BA acquired a stake in Brymon 
Airways, mainly to gain access to London Dockland Airport. Cf. Times 29 Nov., p. 21, 
21 Dec., p. 4; ST 22 Dec., p. 19.
7 It was reported that up to a quarter of the stock was likely to be sold to American




























































































A City law firm, Linklaters and Paines, was commissioned by BA for 
arranging the settlement package. Their task was three-fold: to obtain 
permission from the co-defendants to act as their representative toward the 
plaintiff, to negotiate with them and the creditors about sums they would 
provide or receive, and to make sure no legal action would be attempted 
concerning the failure of Laker Airways. Although the process of 
negotiation was dramatic, it is too detailed to fully describe. Commentary 
will be limited to two major points.
The first point is that BA, having taken the initiative, was paying the 
most. The final settlement was $48 million to the creditors, $8 million to 
Sir Freddie Laker (plus three free trips a year on BA flights over eight 
years), and $12.5 million to all the plaintiff’s lawyers. Although the final 
amount BA actually paid is not clear, it was well over $20 million.8 Added 
to this, BA agreed to pay an extra $12 million over nine years on its own 
borrowing from the U.S. Export-Import Bank, the largest creditor to Laker 
Airways. To the travellers affected by higher fares posterior to the collapse 
of Skytrain (“ class action”), BA, TWA and Pan Am offered discount 
coupons for future transatlantic flights to the tune of $30 million.9
The second point is that the government was determined to finish the 
Laker saga for good. In June, Lonrho, an international trading firm and 
partner in ventures with Sir Freddie Laker, announced its intention to seek 
compensation for damages incurred by the failure of Laker Airways. Ridley, 
the Secretary of State for Transport, publicly criticised Lonrho with unusual 
vehemence.10 When Sir Freddie refused the offer when it was first 
proposed in July, King and Marshall contacted Ridley to abandon a 
comprehensive settlement.11 Both episodes indicate close communication 
between the government and BA throughout the settlement process. 
Moreover, publication of BA’s annual report for 1984-85 was delayed until 
the end of the year, when all the claims concerning the Laker case had been
8 In the course of negotiation, it was agreed that TWA and Pan Am would provide $10 
million each, BCal $5m, and the other European airlines $20m as a group. BA was to 
bear the rest. McDonnell Douglas and its financial subsidiary were creditors to Laker 
Airways. Cf. FT 24 Aug., weekend FT, pp. I, XII. BA had made a provision of £33m 
for cash costs. Cf. BA, Report and Account 1985-86, p. 28 note 3.
9 Notice by the district court of Columbia can be found on Times 20 Nov., p. 8 and ST 
1 Dec., p. 2. See also Times 27 Dec., p. 2. When it was settled in March 1986, the 
applications totaled 215,000, i.e., $18 for each. Cf. FT 21 Mar. 1986, p. 1.
10 Cf. FT  17 June, p. 1; Times 17 June, p. 2. The claim by Lonrho was successfully 
blocked as Sir Freddie agreed to take the offer in August. 1




























































































almost settled. The intention was clear: to proceed with a prospectus with 
no mention of litigation. Although the hurdle was successfully cleared, it 
is tempting to regard the move as a buy-off.12 It may also be added that 
this willingness of BA to settle might have triggered later lawsuits 
concerning Laker.
2. Fleet and Accidents
As the new noise regulation was taking effect, the remaining Tridents were 
to be retired by the end of the year. To replace them, BA was receiving 
B757s but accelerated the move: in February three more B757s were 
purchased at more than £90 million for delivery during the next year, and 
in August, a leasing deal for another three at £98.5 million was announced. 
As a result, this type of aircraft in BA’s fleet came to 23 at the end of the 
financial year. As for the South American routes swapped with BCal, two 
Tristar 500s were leased from Air Lanka of Sri Lanka in March.
BA also began to replace B747 engines, its main workhorses. Engines 
manufactured by Pratt & Whitney of BA’s earliest 12 jumbos were to be 
replaced with RB211-524 D variant, a new type of Rolls-Royce. The 
replacement was estimated to cost £100 million, but the new engines would 
give a longer range (6,300 miles instead of 5,700 miles), enabling non-stop 
flights to the Far East with less fuel consumption. All these fleet 
developments were set back by the accident in August of that year.
The month of August 1985 saw a series of air disasters; on 2nd August, 
133 people died in Dallas, and ten days later, a domestic flight of Japan Air 
Lines, from Tokyo to Osaka, lost control in mid-air and crashed into a 
mountain, causing 520 deaths. On 22 August, the day after BA announced 
the successful conclusion of the Laker litigation, 55 holiday-makers died as 
a Boeing 737-200 of British Airtours (130 seats, 137 on board including 
crew) erupted in flames on runway at Manchester International Airport. The 
cause was engine failure (type JT8D-15A by Pratt & Whitney) during take­
off. After x-ray tests, BA withdrew 22 engines from service.
Although the cause of the Manchester accident was not attributable to the 
operator, there rose a world-wide concern about air travel safety. In the 
U.S., it took the form of allegations of negligence of safety measures by 
financially restrained airlines. In Britain, the dense configuration of seats 
became a central theme. As noted above, BA was rejuvenating its fleet of 
B747s. A part of the scheme consisted of reducing emergency exits from
12 Indeed, Dunlop, BA’s chief financial officer, reportedly said at an early stage that: 




























































































ten to eight. The modification was criticised despite its conformity to the 
international security rule. Other than this, several minor incidents on BA 
flights were reported.13
On 8 November, an agreement of compensation between relatives of the 
victims and the concerned companies, i.e., British Airtours, Boeing Co., and 
Pratt & Whitney, was reached. As was true in the Laker litigation, it was 
an out-of-court settlement of a lawsuit, which was filed in the U.S. on 26 
September. Although the amount of compensation was not revealed, it was 
believed to be “very substantial” .14 Compared with similar cases in Japan, 
this is a very quick settlement. If the lawsuit had proceeded, at least a 
mention would have been necessary in the annual report of the parent 
company.
3. Domestic Competition
Following the Civil Aviation Policy Review of the previous summer, CAA 
was liberalising the process of domestic fare approval. From September, 
airlines needed to publish intended fares for domestic routes only ten days 
in advance, which would be allowed automatically unless the CAA found 
them unfair. Ironically, the result of liberalisation was fare increases.
The first round of increases took place in April. Fares by BA rose less 
sharply than its rivals, so that the price differentials narrowed: BA’s single 
fare for Heathrow-Glasgow/Edinburgh rose from £60 to £62, while that of 
BMA from £57 to £61; the Heathrow-Belfast fare of BA from £59 to £61, 
that of BMA from £57 to £60. They again widened when BA rose its fares 
from September. BCal’s Scottish fares from Gatwick were consistently 
higher than corresponding fares of BA. BA still controlled around 40% of 
the domestic traffic. In autumn the fuel price increased in the UK, and 
airlines responded by raising their fares again.
An important fact is that, despite the liberalisation of the fare approval 
process, price competition did not occur immediately. Of course there were 
price differentials and there was a spate of discounts.15 But the price 
differentials were merely widened or narrowed to the tune of a few pounds, 
not overturned. A series of undercutting and matching did not take place. 
Probably the reason was threefold. Firstly, the air traffic in the UK was on
13 Cf. Times 8 Apr., p. 3; FT 14 Nov., p. 9, 22 Nov., p. 1, 17 Dec., p. 5.
14 Quoted in FT 9 Nov., p. 4.




























































































a comfortable upward trend. Secondly, the independents were looking for 
European routes, which would require financial resources for development. 
And lastly, no domestic trunk route saw a new entrant determined to snatch 
a share from existing carriers.
4. European Routes
Following the Anglo-Dutch air service agreement of the previous year, the 
British government continued to liberalise air transport between the 
European continent and Great Britain, or more precisely, the regional 
airports in Britain. In parallel, British airlines were rushing to announce 
cheaper fares throughout the year, but a fundamental behavioural 
characteristic persisted. The cheap fares introduced by the independents, 
especially those by BCal, were much less restricted in terms of reservation 
and minimum stay requirements than those by BA. BA continued to 
collaborate with its foreign counterparts, even in cases where new bilateral 
agreements no longer bound it to do so. It must also be noted that the 
bilateral agreements were designed so as to encourage international services 
to and from the regional airports in Britain, thus serving the British 
government’s policy of regional airport development, while access to 
Heathrow and Gatwick were severely limited.
From January to February, BA announced deep cuts in fares effective 
from April. The destinations made cheaper were Austria, Belgium, Spain 
and Greece. As in the previous cases, the fares had been agreed upon with 
foreign counterparts, namely Austrian Airlines, Sabena, Iberia, and the usual 
restrictions applied for Apex fares: at the very least, booking was to be 
made two weeks in advance and ticket-holders were required to spend one 
Saturday night abroad. Despite the new Anglo-Dutch agreement signed on 
19 June, the fares set by BA were identical with those of KLM and the 
cheapest fare, £55 for return to Amsterdam (normal economy was £162), 
was so restrictive as to be criticized as meaningless.
Compared to this, BCal offered flights from Gatwick at a higher price 
(£69 return) than the cheapest fares offered by BA and KLM but with no 
advance booking requirements.16 Important to note is that this kind of 
challenge was limited to the countries which had a new liberal agreement 
with Britain. In this regard, however restrictive its terms were for cheap 
fares, BA sometimes preceded the government’s effort to bring down fares. 
Later in the year, Britain concluded new air service agreements with




























































































Belgium (signed on 10 October) and Switzerland (announced on 3 
December). BCal immediately announced a £55 return fare for Brussels, 
effective from December, undercutting BA’s Apex fare by £14.
When proposals for a modest rise (around 5%) on business class and 
economy fares for European destinations were applied by the concerned 
airlines, CAA turned down most of them while accepting all the cheaper 
fare proposals. The fares denied were concerned with Scandinavia, West 
Germany, France and Italy and others. Although CAA explained the reason 
for refusal as “excessive in relation to costs” , it was evidently a political 
decision. If an important objective of the British government in regard to 
“Fortress Europe” was to introduce cheaper fares, BA performed the role 
of military messenger who would negotiate to open a lower window to the 
fortress, and the independents were to serve as water flooding through it. 
Thus BCal could denounce the Association of European Airlines and pull 
out of it in October, while BA retained membership.
Spain deserves a particular mention. The traffic between UK and Spain 
was 8.29 million passengers for 1983, reflecting its popularity among 
British holiday-makers. Consequently, charter traffic was far superior to 
scheduled ones on all Spanish destinations but Madrid.17 The 
“ Moneysaver” and “ Freedom” fares, agreed between BA and Iberia in 
January, were specifically designed to attract this holiday segment.18 When 
the British airlines applied to CAA for a number of European destinations, 
Iberian destinations were the most contested.19 CAA policy was to allow 
smaller airlines, including charter operators, to serve the most popular holi­
day sites with scheduled flights. In February, Air Europe won license to 
start a Gatwick-Palma service starting from May, and announced in August 
a plan of launching scheduled service on the Gatwick-Gibraltar route from 
November.20 In the same month, Britannia Airways won license for 
Manchester-Malaga from November despite BA’s appeal to DoT.21 *
17 McGowan and Trengove, op. cit., p. 63 Table 4.2. Compared to Europe, North 
Atlantic air traffic is largely dominated by scheduled carriers. Cf. ST 5 May, p. 64 chart.
18 Moneysaver fare was valid for stays between six days and one month. Freedom fare 
offered a domestic flight in Spain for an extra £40, with minimum stay requirement over 
Saturday and valid for six months. Cf. FT 17 Jan., p. 7; Times 11 May, p. 13.
19 Cf. FT 21 Mar., p. 8.
20 Cf. FT 13 Feb., p. 8, 20 Aug., p. 6.
21 Cf. FT 6 Aug., p. 6. On the other hand, DoT sought to reduce Iberia’s flights on




























































































In general, governments involved in deregulation have a tendency to 
designate other than their traditional flag carrier for service to the nearest 
touristic countries. As noted above, CAB refused Pan Am’s request to take 
over Braniff’s Latin American network; another example is that All Nippon 
Airways expanded itself from charter operations for such proximate 
destinations as Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong to the international 
scheduled services. This tendency could be explained by aeronautical 
technical reasons, but implies a necessity for traditional flag carriers to be 
prepared for, first, fierce competition (including designation process) in 
nearby areas and in the home market, and second, securing profitability of 
non-competitive long-haul routes.
5. Transatlantic Routes
The British government’s policy in regard to transatlantic routes was to 
leave the existing competition in place. At the same time, however, it was 
anxious not to provoke anti-trust litigation against BA. For, despite the 
declaration by the U.S. Justice Department, Virgin Atlantic was well able 
to bring a civil suit in the U.S. Thus in January, CAA refused again BA’s 
“Late-saver” fare proposal for £259 return on Heathrow-JFK route, while 
allowing “Early-saver” fare at the same fare on the same route.22 BA had 
to make a new proposal at £282 return for this route.
The tactic employed by BA in the transatlantic area was to keep its cheap 
fares competitive for the new cut-rate carriers, while jacking up the fares 
for business travellers in line with its American counterparts. Thus it 
applied to CAA for summer fares after it had agreed with Pan Am and 
TWA, under the auspice of IATA, to raise fares from April. Apex fare for 
Heathrow-JFK was to rise to £362 in April, and again to £384 in July. 
Economy fare remained unchanged at £233 for single. Virgin Atlantic and 
People Express made similar applications, but given the low level of their 
previous fares, increases were sharper.
People Express was dropping out. Its management style, although much 
hailed, was fragile and its growth as well as employee motivation was 
exceedingly reliant on the company’s stock price.23 Reflecting critical
22 “ Late-saver” was bookable within three days of departure, whereas “ Early-saver” , 
an Apex fare, required booking three weeks in advance. The late-saver fares to all the 
other American destinations were admitted.
23 Cf. Shibata (1988), op. cit., pp. 123-124. People Express was acquired by Texas Air 




























































































financial strain, its fare adjustment became very frequent. In January, its 
Gatwick-Newark single fare was intended to.'rise from £122 to £154. It 
went up to £181, down to £166 in July, to £l47 in August, and then to 
£131 in November. People Express also launched a plan to serve Brussels. 
All these alterations reflect a desperate effort to preserve profitability and 
competitiveness in spite of exchange rate fluctuations.
Virgin Atlantic also changed fares, but less abruptly and frequently than 
People Express. It also made a successful joint fare promotions with Pan 
Am, TWA, and Northwest Orient. The domestic competition in the U.S. 
was so intensive that these American airlines agreed to provide a passenger 
arriving on Virgin Atlantic with an internal flight for a mere $22.24
In May, BCal resumed its Gatwick-JFK service after eleven years of 
disruption. In September, BA launched a series of stand-by fare decrease 
in regard to the American destinations, undercutting both Virgin Atlantic’s 
standard fare and BCal’s stand-by fare to New York. BCal matched 
immediately. On the other hand, BA announced its intention to start 
services to Argentina and Grenada in addition to other South American 
destinations, while adding Miami, Tampa and Orlando to its American 
destinations. No doubt it decided to develop its transatlantic network.
6. Challenge from the Far East
If the management of BA, as well as the British government, loudly 
advocated deregulation in Europe, they adopted a different attitude toward 
the Far East.
Since February 1983, Singapore Airlines (SIA) applied several times for 
service between Manchester and Singapore. Manchester International 
Airport Authority welcomed it, but DoT requested SIA to cut is daily 
flights to Heathrow as condition of approval. As the bilateral air service 
agreement between UK and Singapore did not lay down to preclude the 
capacity of service, the British government’s attitude was criticised not only 
by Singaporians but also by several MPs representing the Manchester 
area.25 In March 1985, the Singapore government formally applied for 
access to Manchester (three flights a week). Then BA suggested to the 
Manchester International Airport Authority that services by SIA, “ an
24 Cf. Times 24 Oct., p. 4.




























































































aggressive airline that would cream off the best of the business” , would 
jeopardise BA’s expansion plan from the airport.26
Indeed SIA was the most favoured airline by bankers, and its Heathrow- 
Chiangi operation enjoyed an 89% load factor, an exceptionally high figure 
for international scheduled service, while BA operated at 61% on the route.
The Singapore government decided to put pressure by excluding British 
companies from tendering lists for the construction of the second terminal 
at Chiangi airport. The tactic proved to be effective; in May, Ridley gave 
SIA permission for two flights a week to Manchester despite DoT’s advice. 
BA and SLA reached agreement in September: SIA would start Manchester 
service in April 1986, while BA continued to serve only Heathrow-Chiangi.
A similar attitude could be found in regard to Malaysia. In May 1984, 
Malaysian Airline Systems (MAS) was refused to increase the number of 
flights between Kuala Lumpur and London from four to five a week. MAS 
argued that the demand on the route justified the fifth flight, which BA 
contested. In October 1984, the Malaysian government ended tax exemption 
for people who receive air trips as part of their remuneration except in 
cases where they flew MAS, and halted talks with a British consortium 
working on a project of Malaysian railway development. In April 1985, 
Prime Minister Mrs Thatcher, on a visit to South East Asian nations, agreed 
to the fifth flight in principle. BA wanted in exchange the fifth freedom, 
i.e., right to pick up passengers in Malaysia to be transported to a third 
country, but seemingly failed to obtain it. After a series of talks, the final 
agreement was signed in September: weekly capacity for each carrier was 
enlarged from 1,240 to 1,550 passengers and BA and MAS would start a 
fifth flight in November 1985 and in July 1986, respectively.
The third example was the Philippines. In 1984 the bilateral air service 
agreement between UK and the Philippines terminated. The negotiation for 
a new agreement was broken in September 1985, over the question of the 
number of flights. Philippine Airlines flew three times a week, while BA 
flew twice. BA demanded Philippine Airlines either to drop down one, or 
to pay a royalty of £745,000. The latter agreed to pay the royalty but 
insisted on £500,000.27 Apart from these ASEAN countries, BA strongly 
opposed BCal’s application for Japan and Korea.
At first glance, all these instances make a sharp contrast with the British 
attitude vis-à-vis Europe. Of course one could explain that BA was fearful 
of these non-IATA, low-cost, and highly competitive carriers. They would 
undermine the profitability of BA’s Far East market centre, and snatch
26 Cf. ST 31 Mar., p. 57.




























































































away passengers heading to/from Oceania, that of the Australia and New 
Zealand market centres as well.28 Yet the anger of the Asian governments 
(and that of UK Department of Trade and Foreign Office) might not have 
been caused if BA had not acted as a governmental body at early stages. 
At least in the cases of Singapore and Malaysia, BA was allowed to act as 
a government department toward the foreign governments and airlines. This 
capacity was long inherited from its ancestors. In the days of Imperial 
Airways and, later, of BOAC, the state-owned airline could well be 
expected (and sometimes forced) to serve the interests of the empire or the 
Commonwealth as a whole. Due to historical changes and in the face of 
privatisation and competition, BA was no longer to serve these interests, but 
its own.
7. Labour Relations
The postponement of privatisation made an effect on internal labour 
management. The two-year pay deal of 1984 was expiring at the end of the 
year and the unions were eager to change some aspects. The management 
tried to simplify the pay and grades, but met resistance by disruption of 
operation.
On 30 January, many short-haul flights from Heathrow were grounded 
as cabin crews stopped work. The dispute was over in-flight catering duty 
on BAC1-11, which the contract did not cover. Unions of clerical and 
administrative staff were in dispute over reduction of grades (from eleven 
to six). Engineers and maintenance staff, also disputing job restructuring, 
resorted to an industrial action in August. However, it was essential for the 
management to keep payroll under control. It became all the more necessary 
as the need for fleet replacement arose. In addition, job restructuring was 
probably connected to the company’s Corporate Identity movement as 
well.29
The negotiation over a new pay deal started in autumn. The unions 
sought, among other things, to replace the profit sharing scheme with an 
extra month’s pay, which could be more easily accepted as collateral for
In fact BA cut fares to Australia in the winter of 1986-87. Cf. FT 2 Aug., 1986, p. 
4; Times 16 Aug., 1986, p. 3, 13 Sept. , 1986, p. 13.
29 As stated above, a Cl is intended to renew the employees’ morale. As for BA’s 
campaign in this respect, see Times 15 Oct., 1983, p. 5, 14 Feb., 1984, p. 20, 4 Dec., 




























































































bank loans, overdrafts or mortgages.30 The second point was over the level 
of wage, which the unions claimed to be in the lowest category in the 
industry. Compared with the other European state-owned airlines and, 
especially with Americans, it seems true that BA employees were less well 
paid. This was partly the reason BA’s payroll in operating costs was 
competitively low. For example, average annual earnings for members of 
ALPA (Air Line Pilots Association of the U.S.) in 1984 were $112,000 
(approximately £77,700), while basic salary of BA’s senior captain was 
£29,035 in 1985, although the latter does not include allowances.31 The 
management stood firm and the negotiation dragged on.
30 Thanks to the operating profits, the employees received a bonus equivalent to 6.5% 
of salary in the profit sharing scheme. The calculation method had changed over time: 
instead of a week’s pay for each £50m of operating surplus over £150m, they received 
a bonus of one-fiftieth of a week’s pay for every £lm  of operating surplus over the 
same threshold. Cf. FT 2 Mar., p. 3. However, a part of bonuses was accumulated for 
the employee stock ownership plan.
31 Cf. Shibata (1986), op. cit., p. 62 note 33; FT 16 Dec., p. 8. BA executives did not 
earn as much as those in the American airline industry; Marshall, the most highly paid, 
received £78,720. Cf. Times 31 Dec., p. 2. For international comparison as of 1982, see 




























































































V. 1986: Toward a New Environment
In 1986, the date of privatisation was fixed for the next spring. The 
decision was affected by various factors. A sharp downturn of American 
tourists in the first half showed the deep dependence of British carriers on 
the North Atlantic market. The British government tried to limit competition 
by setting up a capacity limitation regime within Bermuda n, which was 
one reason for postponement of privatisation. The management of BA 
became impatient to obtain independence of management, and seemingly 
clashed with the government. Meanwhile “Fortress Europe” was formally 
denounced by the European Court of Justice, giving further momentum to 
liberalisation of air transport in Europe. The member governments were 
obliged to cope with the new order of the day but found it extremely 
difficult. In many ways, this was the year that a new regime started to be 
formed.
1. Privatisation Date Fixed
At the beginning of the year, BA seemed to have no more inherent 
obstacles against privatisation. Although a series of lawsuits concerning the 
demise of Laker were filed, they were easier to surmount than the former 
case. One was brought by Ambassador International Travel, a travel agent 
in Los Angeles, claiming damage due to Laker’s bankruptcy. Another was 
filed by former Laker employees. The class action for travellers was still 
to be settled. BA argued these lawsuits were not as embarrassing an 
obstacle as the one that had been settled the previous year.
On the other hand, BA’s debt-equity ratio had been steadily improved. 
The outstanding debt of BA, £901 million at 30 March 1984, had been 
reduced to £464 million by 30 September 1985. Discussion between the 
government, financial institutions and BA started in February. Seemingly, 
the government was eager at the first stage, and planned even to send a 
prospectus for BA’s share through the client lists of major banks in the 
City. Michael Spicer, Under Secretary responsible for aviation, noted:
The sale of British Airways is central to the Government’s wider share-ownership 
schemes, and the sale of shares in the airline is an important ingredient in the 
policy.1
1 Quoted in FT 3 Feb., p. 8. See also Times 8 Feb., p. 23. This attitude would 





























































































As the discussion was conducted behind the scenes, it is unknown why 
this optimism of the government changed by early March. It is clear, 
however, that the management of BA stressed its need of new aircraft and 
that the government was not keen with the idea. On 6 March, King 
commented in a private meeting of MPs:
If the owner of any business stands as a barrier between that business and the funds 
it requires for investment, it is a bad owner....We do not want to be constrained by 
the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement from raising or sponsoring capital because 
of the need of the Government of the day to build a section of motorway or a 
hospital, or electrify a few miles of railway line.2
On 12 March, Ridley declared another postponement without specifying 
for how long. He cited as the reason uncertainties about the negotiation of 
Bermuda H. The Anglo-US negotiation started a month earlier. Reportedly, 
the British side sought two things: to prevent American carriers’ overall 
capacity from swamping the market and to obtain guarantees against 
prosecution under the U.S. anti-trust law. The former point was already 
included in the Annex II of the Bermuda II agreement, to expire in July. 
Ironically, despite its advocacy of deregulation in Europe, the UK was seen 
by the U.S. as representing protectionist European countries, and scrapping 
Bermuda II was a prime objective of U.S. officials.3
It is probably true that British officials did not want to weaken their 
bargaining position vis-à-vis the Americans by setting a time-limit. As the 
expiration of Annex II would allow airlines to increase capacity without 
constraint, the U.S. had no particular need to renew it while Britain, if 
privatisation of BA had been definitely set, would have found herself in a 
weaker position. However, this concern is a matter of diplomatic bargaining 
tactics. Whether Annex n , a capacity limitation clause, was necessary for 
BA to be successfully privatised is a different question.
Of course Annex II was not only intended to protect BA but all the 
British air carriers serving the North Atlantic. BCal was suffering from 
decreases in Gulf business because of the falling oil price. The importance 
of North Atlantic for BCal was far greater than for BA.4 The underlying 
thought here is that the British carriers, notably BA, would not be able to 
compete with their “powerful” American rivals. But were they really 
“powerful”?
2 Quoted in FT 1 Mar., p. 9.
3 Cf. Joensson, op. cit., pp. 124-125; Dobson, op. cit., pp. 267-268.




























































































The American carriers in the North Atlantic Were in bad financial shape. 
Pan Am was struggling to keep afloat, selling its Pacific network to United 
Airlines in 1985. Edward Acker, chairman of Pan Am since September 
1981, pursued a strategy to concentrate on the Atlantic flank. The sell-off 
of the Pacific division was followed by a 30% increase in its capacity in the 
Atlantic in 1985. In 1986, Pan Am was planning another 30% increase.5 
However, having incurred huge losses in its domestic operations, Pan Am 
never launched a full-scale price war in the transatlantic market and 
substantially cut down the planned increase in May. TWA, another 
dominant American carrier in the North Atlantic, was spun off by its parent 
Trans World Corp in 1984 because of the airline’s large losses in the 
domestic operation, and became the target of a fierce takeover battle 
between Carl Icahn and Frank Lorenzo in 1985. People Express was falling 
into the hands of Lorenzo, chairman of Texas Air Corp.
All these “powerful” American carriers suffered from huge losses due 
to cut-throat domestic competition. The North Atlantic was one of the rare 
profitable areas for Pan Am and TWA, but it means that they had to 
maintain profitability in this market.6 Indeed this is one reason why they 
coordinated BA by setting fares. As the table below shows, their yields, i.e. 
revenue per passenger mile, remained fairly constant in the Atlantic market 
despite the challenge by such cut-rate carriers as People Express and Virgin 
Atlantic. It was quite unlikely they would launch a full-scale capacity war 
in the North Atlantic, or could afford to do so, either.
Yields o f the major American carriers in the Atlantic market (annual average, US cents)
Pan Am TWA People Express
1985.3.31 11.74 11.46 5.59
1986.3.31 11.85 11.40 6.15
1987.3.31 12.15 11.54 6.43
Source: DoT (US), Air Carrier Traffic Statistics', Air Carrier Financial Statistics.
5 Cf. Shibata (1986), op. cit., pp. 64-65. Pan Am was the most hit by the downturn of 
transatlantic traffic; the load factor of its atlantic flights fell to 44.6% in April, and in 
May to a dismal 39.7%. Cf. Department of Transportation, Air Carrier Traffic Statistics 
Monthly April 1986, May 1986.
6 For TWA and Pan Am in this period, as well as an American view on the transatlantic 
market after the U.S. deregulation, see Herbert R. Northrup, “ The New Employee- 





























































































Certainly, BA was in a fragile position. It had to maintain a good track 
record for a successful sell-off; intense competition in the North Atlantic, 
if it occurred, would have erased its profit.7 Nevertheless, BA was in far 
better financial shape than most of its American rivals. Presumably, it 
would well have attracted investors regardless of whether Annex II was 
renewed or not.
Another possible reason, although as speculative as the above argument, 
was the privatisation scheme of the British government. As the next general 
election was to take place in the following year, the Thatcher government 
was in need of political gain. At the beginning of 1986, there still remained 
a number of state-owned organisations to be privatised. Among them were 
Trustee Savings Bank (TSB), British Gas, Rolls-Royce, British Airports 
Authority (BAA), Royal Ordnance Factories and the National Bus 
Company.
In hindsight, TSB and British Gas, both of which were privatised in 
1986, were much more suited to political needs. Firstly, they were larger in 
terms of money they would raise: privatisation of TSB realised £1.36 billion 
(although the proceeds were retained by TSB), and that of British Gas 
brought the Treasury £5.6 billion, compared to BA’s £0.9 billion.8 They 
served also to widen share ownership: 5 million people applied for TSB 
shares, 7 million for British Gas, compared to slightly more than 1 million 
in case of BA. Comparison of minimum initial instalments illustrates the 
government’s intention clearly: applicants for BA shares were required to 
pay £260 minimum (65p per share, 400 shares), while those for British Gas 
£50 (50p per share, 100 shares). These differences arose from the nature of 
each company and industry it operated. British Gas, like British Telecom, 
was a public utility monopoly while BA, though profitable, was in a highly 
competitive industry, which made it a less safe item for investment by those 
not familiar with the stock market. To put it otherwise, the above-cited 
statement by Spicer applied better to TSB and British Gas than to BA.
BA reacted angrily. Immediately after the announcement of 
postponement, the management took up an employee buyout plan and King 
brought it to the Prime Minister on 17 March, only to be rebuffed.9 This 
is a curious move, since the management must have been keenly aware of 
the political gain that the government was seeking, however tacitly, out of 
its privatisation policy. Yet there were particular reasons for this impatience.
7 A pact between the U.S. and some European countries, including UK, imposed certain 
limits on fare levels in the north Atlantic market. Cf. Dempsey, op. cit., pp. 623-626.
8 Cf. Vickers & Yarrow (1989), op. cit., p. 223 Table 4.




























































































First, the stock market was booming. In March KLM raised £200 million 
by selling in the international market new issues and a portion of the shares 
retained by the Dutch government. In May, Cathay Pacific Airlines went 
public in Hong Kong with a comfortable oversubscription at 55 times the 
shares offered. BA was missing the chance.
Second, the North Atlantic market was showing a sharp drop after a 
boom. It was increasingly clear that the summer booking would experience 
a heavy decrease. It was triggered by weakening of the dollar but later in 
the spring, the situation became all the more serious as American tourists, 
fearful of terrorist action in regard to Libyan bombing and fallout from the 
Chernobyl nuclear disaster, turned away.10 1*
Third, as noted in the previous chapter, BA was planning a large re­
equipment program. It was closely associated with an overall development 
of strategic facilities at Heathrow. The company already opened a large 
computer centre in July 1985, and in April 1986, the fourth Terminal 
started to function. As the plan foresaw replacement of its fleet at the rate 
of more than £500 million a year over a decade, BA was in need of access 
to capital markets. But the sum for the purchase, several billion pounds, 
would never be possible to raise as long as the company was kept under 
PSBR constraint. Another aspect of this action is that the management of 
BA came to prefer, by this time, to improve the company’s balance sheet 
through an enlarged capital base, rather than decreasing debt on the basis 
of the current equity capital.
And fourthly, the delay of privatisation was bound to affect the 
company’s morale adversely. The profit-sharing scheme was operated in 
relation to share options; a large number of employees deposited their 
bonuses to buy the company’s shares at privatisation. The management 
team that King and Marshall had built was composed of the people who, 
after all, viewed privatisation as their primary task and objective. In June 
Derek Jewson, general manager for UK passenger sales, resigned. Later in 
the same month, Howard Phelps, head of Operations Department, 
announced his retirement.
During the summer BA tried hard to stimulate North Atlantic traffic and 
made certain progress. Meanwhile, the Anglo-US negotiation progressed. 
On 11 September the final agreement was reached.11 In the revised Annex
10 Cf. “ Wooing punters as well as passengers” , The Economist 23 Aug., pp. 56, 58.
11 Exchange o f Notes between the Government o f the United Kingdom o f Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States o f America further
amending the Agreement concerning Air Services, signed at Bermuda on 23 July 1977,




























































































II, the British secured a provision of consultative process to preclude 
capacity and to impose a certain limit on it.12 Although unsuccessful to 
obtain a guarantee of exemption from the U.S. anti-trust law,13 the British 
government no longer regarded it as a hurdle to be cleared.14 On the same 
day, the privatisation of BA was formally announced to take place early in 
the next year. It was already decided that TSB and British Gas would be 
privatised during the current year. By this date, the litigations concerning 
Laker had been either settled or dismissed. As for pricing and decisions 
about method of share allotment, BA had to wait until the next year.
2. Transatlantic Market
As noted above, the transatlantic traffic between the U.S. and Europe 
declined sharply in that year. In April, the U.S. forces bombed Tripoli. As 
the British government supported the action, several retaliatory terrorist 
actions took place. The fear was aggravated by the Chernobyl nuclear 
disaster, which deterred Americans from visiting Europe Consequently BA 
suffered a drop of 18% of traffic on its North Atlantic flights in the first six 
weeks of its financial year, and the load factor was down to 50%. To entice 
American travellers, BA announced a bold plan on 20 May; 5,600 free 
round trip tickets were offered to the Americans.15 *On the other hand, the 
company cancelled recruitment of 1,500 part-time cabin staff for the 
summer season and called upon employees to accept unpaid leave. The 
other airlines also tried to generate traffic by a series of deep cuts. To cite 
cheapest single fares to New York, Virgin Atlantic offered £56, People 
Express £66, TWA £115 for passengers aged between 12 and 24 (refused 
by CAA), and BCal and BA £149 for stand-by. But these price-cuttings did 
not overcome the difficulty. BA’s transatlantic bookings dropped by 25%
12 Ibid., pp. 4-5. The provision, which was called as “ 150% rule” , guaranteed a 40% 
share in capacity to the both countries.
13 Three years later, it was vaguely redefined in another exchange of notes. Cf. 
Exchange o f Notes between the Government o f the United Kingdom o f Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government o f the United States o f America concerning the 
licensing o f their respective airlines to operate International Air Services, Treaty Series 
no. 42, Cm 793, HMSO, 1989, p. 3 above.
14 John Moore, successor of Ridley from May, said: “ I am ... satisfied that anti-trust 
issues need no longer delay the flotation [of BA].” Quoted in FT 12 Sept., p. 1.
15 For details of these “ Lift Off for Britain”  and “ Go for It, America” campaigns, see




























































































in May and by 17% in June when compared to the same months of the 
previous year. It was not until August that the traffic began to recover. 
Consequently, the revenue of BA’s airline operation in the first half was 
£1,559 million, down from £1,640 million a year earlier; the operating 
profit decreased more than a quarter, to £151 million from £205 million.16
Apart from the dependency of BA on the North Atlantic, the summer 
situation in 1986 also provides an instance of the general vulnerability of 
international aviation to political and/or environmental upheavals. With its 
global network, BA is apt to suffer from incidents in many parts of the 
world. The Falklands and Gulf wars are other instances.
3. European Routes
In March, an Anglo-Italian agreement on air services was signed in 
Florence, which opened Milan to some British independent airlines.17 On 
the route between Dublin and London, Ryanair, an Irish independent airline, 
was challenging BA and Air Lingus.18 In both cases, BA offered fares 
identical to those of its foreign counterparts. This practice was severely 
challenged that year.
On 30 April, the European Court of Justice ruled that fare-fixing 
practices by member countries and airlines were illegal in light of the 
article 85 of Treaty of Rome.19 *The ruling was made in regard to price- 
cutting practices by several French travel agencies, among them Nouvelles
16 Cf. ST 23 Nov., p. 73. The operating profit in the first quarter to 30 June was £38 
million compared to £90 million a year earlier. Ibid.
17 By this agreement BCal was allowed to fly between Gatwick and Milan, Birmingham 
Executive Airways between Birmingham and Milan, Cathay Pacific between Hong Kong 
and Rome, and British Airways to connect Manchester-Milan-Rome. Cf. FT 13 Feb., p.
4, 14 Mar., p. 7.
18 Ryanair started operating between Dublin and Luton on 23 May with four daily 
flights. One way fare was £59 and return £85, deeply undercutting the corresponding 
fares by BA and Air Lingus. Cf. FT 24 Apr., p. 3; Times 2 May, p. 3.
19 This ‘ ‘landmark” ruling is reviewed and discussed in a large amount of literature. See
Prodromos D. Dagtoglou, “ Air Transport after the Nouvelles Frontières Judgement” , 
in P.J. Slot and P.D. Dagtoglou (eds.), Toward a Community Air Transport Policy: The 
Legal Dimension, Kluwer, 1989, pp. 115-118; Carl Otto Lenz, “ The Contribution of the 
European Court of Justice to the Common Air Transport Policy” , in P.D. Dagtoglou 
(ed.), Air Transport and the European Community: Recent Developments, European Air 
Law Association Conference Papers no.l, Kluwer, 1990, pp. 19-34; McGowan & 




























































































Frontières, which sold tickets issued by Air France at prices below the 
approved tariff. The Tribunal de Police de Paris had referred the matter to 
the Court for ruling a year earlier. Prompted by the ruling, the European 
Commission published proposals for liberalisation on 19 June, and warned 
the member governments of legal action if they failed to act.
Although the Commission’s proposals still acquiesced to the 
governments’ intervention to prevent their flag carrier’s capacity share from 
falling below 25% on each route, the Council of Ministers in charge of 
transportation failed to discuss the matter because of the large differences 
of opinion between the members. In July Moore, the British minister, 
assumed the presidency of the Council, which was set for 10 November. On 
10 July the Commission started sending warning letters to the airlines 
including BA and BCal, demanding explanation of fare-fixing arrangements 
between them before 20 September, though the period was extended by 
another two months by requests from the airlines.
On 11 and 12 November, the Council of Ministers was held in Brussels. 
The British proposal was rejected.20 On 15 December, the Council met for 
the last time under Moore’s presidency, only to reach deadlock once again. 
It was a year after that it reached agreement.21
One immediate effect of the mling was a series of challenges by 
independents on the busiest metropolitan routes in Europe. In April, BCal 
anticipated the ruling by declaring fares to Paris undercutting those of BA 
and Air France, and was soon followed in May by Virgin Atlantic, which 
declared its intention to break into Paris-London market. In June fares for 
London-Amsterdam was deeply brought down by BMA, and new Dutch 
airlines were also entering into the fray.22
20 As for the British proposal, Cf. “ Skyway robbery” , The Economist Nov. 15, p. 16, 
“ Europe’s air fares: unfair” , loc. cit., pp. 49-50. Moore was heavily criticised for the 
moderate proposal. Although his attitude was attributed to the concern of successful 
privatisation of BA, it is hard to believe that the British government dared to appear 
protectionist in exchange for one billion pounds. Certainly Moore was anxious to obtain 
progress toward deregulation, essentially as a political success, but miscalculated the 
other countries’ response.
21 Community Regulations (EEC) 3975/87 and 3976/87. They were adopted on 14 
December 1987. The texts are given in: Frere Cholmeley, Air Law and the European 
Community, Current EC Legal Development Series, Butterworth, 1990, pp. 128-147, and 
also in Dempsey, op. cit., pp. 687-709. It was the expiration of the Article 2 of the latter 
Regulation that liberalised international air transport in EC on 1st January 1993.
22 For Paris-London market, see FT 1 May, pp. 1, 48; ST 4 May, p. 5, 15 June, p. 62. 
For Amsterdam and other Dutch destinations, see Times 16 May, p. 3, 1 July, p. 6; FT 




























































































The second effect was a shift of dimension. Since the ruling, the 
deregulation between the European countries became a subject of 
multilateral negotiation and bargaining at EC level rather than a matter of 
bilateral ones. As such, it requires additional and separate study from a 
different point of view to analyse the series of negotiations, regulations and 
decisions which ensued.23 Here it suffices to point out that a new regime 
which the judgement started to shape in Europe was the one which BA and 
other British airlines were rather prepared to live with.
4. Engine Decision and its Financing
As the course of events shows, the privatisation of BA was, above all, a 
political matter. As such, the management of the company suffered from 
requirements imposed by the government’s political needs. On the other 
hand, being a subject of politics enabled BA to make use of the concerns 
of politicians and the government to its own commercial interests. As 
described in Chapter Three, BA’s threat to deprive a regional airport of its 
operation proved to be effective in securing political pressure against an 
unfavourable policy. Another example could be found in the decision it 
took in regard to engines. Here, political concerns resulted in more 
favourable terms of purchase and finance than there would have been 
otherwise.
In mid-June, it was reported that BA was considering General Electric’s 
CF6-80C2 as a possible choice for the power plant for the B747-400s that 
the company was planning to order. Not only Labour MPs but some 
Conservative backbenchers took notice of the news, since the order in 
question, worth several million pounds, was considered to be vital for 
Rolls-Royce, and therefore, for the British aero-engine industry. Moreover, 
as Rolls-Royce was one of the candidates for privatisation, it needed a good 
financial performance for the same reasons as BA. Although Rolls-Royce 
had already secured the launching order for its RB211-524D4 engine from 
Cathay Pacific, BA’s choice was bound to affect the prospect of its sales. 
On 10 June Neil Kinnock, leader of Labour Party, urged the government to 
take measures to ensure that the order went to Rolls-Royce. Thatcher 
refused and replied that the company should “ win orders on merit” .
At the end of the month, another American engine maker, Pratt & 
Whitney, joined the bidding with its PW-4000. BA requested the tenders to
23 For a concise account of the European civil aviation policy, see Eugene Sochor, The 




























































































submit their final offers by 18 July. Meanwhile, it became clear that BA’s 
inclination toward the GE engine was largely related to its financing 
proposal, arranged by GE’s sister company, General Electric Credit 
Corporation.
Rolls-Royce then hastily assembled banks to set up a package. 
Importantly, in both cases the finance was to cover the aircraft as well as 
the engines. In other words, these engine manufacturers had to negotiate 
terms of finance with the bankers on behalf of BA. During the process, it 
was also made clear that the number of aircraft BA intended to acquire 
(B747-436) was 16, with an option of an additional 12. Goldman Sachs, 
Rolls-Royce’s financial advisor, set up an international syndicate which 
would provide a $2.3 billion loan facility.
On 15 August, Rolls-Royce emerged as winner of the contract. 
Meanwhile the competition between the financial institutions became heated 
in the City; the group by Goldman Sachs fell apart. On 20 September, 
another group headed by National Westminster Bank won the deal.24 *In 
October, BA placed the aircraft order to Boeing.
At first glance, the episode provokes several questions: was there any 
political pressure on BA? or did BA use its choice as a lever to win 
privatisation? As for the first question, both Rolls-Royce and BA have 
denied it. As for the second, there is no examples which support the 
assumption that BA bargained its choice to secure its privatisation from the 
government.
On the other hand, however, BA gained a lot out of the development of 
events. Firstly, it secured the government’s approval for its plan to purchase 
16 B747-436s, the biggest order in the civil aviation industry to date if the 
option was exercised. As Rolls-Royce was involved, the approval for the 
whole plan was but an inevitable one for the government. Secondly, the 
competition between the banks demonstrated their eagerness to participate 
in the financing of BA, which, presumably, was an assuring sign for the 
company’s sell-off. We must note that the contest in the City intensified 
before the announcement of the privatisation date. And lastly, thanks to the 
competition between the banks, the financing facility was enlarged and its 
term improved. It would not have occurred unless Rolls-Royce was 
convinced to draw its own package. To show that one has other fish to fry
24 Besides NatWest, arrangers were Barclays Bank, Midland Bank, Citicorp Investment 
Bank, Mitsubishi Trust and Banking Corp. The deal was an operating lease. The




























































































is quite a common and classical tactic in business.25 Although who leaked 
the first news at the very early stage is not revealed, the outcome was 
satisfactory to BA, Rolls-Royce, and the government.
5. Labour Relations
As noted in the last chapter, the pay negotiation extended to 1986. 
Compared with the negotiations held in 1984, there were several 
differences. The first was that the pay rise was not unilateral. For example 
the pilots, who accepted the offer at an early stage, secured a 20% raise in 
wages for the next two years, whereas the engineering and maintenance 
staff, after a lengthy negotiation process, had to strike a deal of a 16% raise 
for the same period. The second difference was that the management 
insisted on productivity concessions and job flexibility (horizontal 
enlargement of job), including simplification of grades. The third difference 
lies in the circumstances of business overall; in 1984, the company was 
returning to profitability thanks partly to the boom in the North Atlantic 
traffic, while in 1986, this market was in a critical situation, threatening the 
company’s profitability. «
On 14 March, the engineering and maintenance staff rejected the offer, 
which was composed of an 8% raise for the year and another 8% for the 
next. The Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) recommended to 
the ground service staff and cabin crew to accept the deal at 16%.26 Ten 
days later, the negotiation with the engineering and maintenance staff was 
agreed to be reopened. By this time, the management had secured the 
acceptance of the aircraft engine maintenance staff at Treforest, South 
Wales, thus effectively split its counterpart. On the other hand, as the 
clause of job flexibility that the management sought to obtain along with 
the pay rise included transfer of certain jobs from blue-collar to white-collar 
staff, the latter, the engineering supervisors and technicians, also rejected 
the offer, and proceeded to ballot for industrial action.
On 7 May, the talks broke down again despite urging by Amalgamated 
Engineering Union (AEU) to accept the offer. In mid-May, the professional 
engineers and senior draughtsmen accepted an 18% offer. Increasingly, the 
militant elements of the unions found themselves alienated. AEU members
25 In June, BA executive was reported to have said: “ Rolls-Royce seemed to think they 
would get the order, and sent along their second eleven.” Quoted in ST 29 June, p. 57.
26 It was composed of a 6% raise retrospective to 1 January, a further 3% from 1 July, 




























































































decided to accept the offer, while TGWU stood against. Toward the end of 
the month a ballot took place among the unions but the result was so slight 
(51.5% against industrial action) that the unions found themselves unable 
to act either way.27 After TGWU members also accepted the offer on 9 
June, the last acceptance was secured from the administrative and clerical 
staff in early August.28
In the process described above, we find some common features as well 
as particularities compared to the American situation. The first common 
feature is the plurality of unions. As the airline operation requires one of 
the highest standards of precision in various aspects, the workforce is 
composed of highly skilled, qualified and specialised personnel. The 
specialisation, coupled with the difference of career paths, leads to 
establishment of the unions corresponding to each specialised job field. 
However, it seems that the state-owned airlines tend to find within them 
more unions than the private ones. BA had sixteen, an unusual number in 
the U.S. case, but a figure corresponding to, for example, Japan Air Lines.
Secondly, the relative readiness of the pilots to compromise and the 
confrontational attitude of the blue-collar engineers are both common in the 
American cases. It is usually explained that pilots, the highest paid, tend to 
be compromising as their expertise is rewarded only in the civil aviation 
industry. We find many cases in the U.S. where the Air Line Pilots 
Association (ALPA) was the first to make concessions. In case of engineers 
(mechanics), the pay difference is relatively small between aviation and 
other industries. As aircraft is one of the most sophisticated and advanced 
kinds of equipment, airline mechanics are highly qualified engineers, and 
thus able to secure a high grade in other industries. The militant character 
of the International Association of Machinists (IAM) in the U.S. hardly 
needs mentioning.29
One should also note that the negotiations held in 1986 between the 
management and unions of BA, though complex and heated, were basically 
not antagonistic. BA could offer pay raises throughout the period that this
27 Cf. FT  27 May, p. 12.
28 The deal struck by TGWU members was composed of an 8% raise retroactively to 
19 March, another 8% in 1987, with pay and grading review for January 1988. Cf. FT 
10 June, p. 15. The deal with the administrative and clerical staff was the same as that 
of the ground service staff and cabin crew. Cf. FT 5 Aug., p. 8.
29 For a bnef review of the labour relations in the American airline industry, see 
Blumestock, James W., and Thomchick, Evelyn A., “ Deregulation and Airline Labor 





























































































paper deals with. American cases in the corresponding period are full of 
pay-cuts, strikes and legal disputes. Deregulation is usually understood to 
lead to competition over products (price, routes and capacity). The other 
side of the coin, viewed from management, is that it forces the management 
to engage in a contest to bring or keep down the costs.30 Thus airlines 
under deregulation are forced to set up as competitive a cost structure as 
possible. As the payroll is one of the controllable factors, the internal 
struggle between unions and management is bound to be fierce. Thanks 
primarily to the radical slimdown in 1982, and also thanks to the 
comparative wage advantage, BA was somewhat exempt from these fierce 
internal struggles.
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As this paper aims at describing events related to the privatisation of BA, 
this chapter only deals with the first months of 1987. The merger between 
BCal and BA, the negotiation between the British and Spanish governments 
in regard to Gibraltar, in connection to the British policy at the EC level, 
and the moves toward deregulation in Europe, are left undiscussed.1
The privatisation consisted of several steps, but the whole process was 
rather rushed. On 8 January, BA published a preliminary prospectus 
(“pathfinder” ) which stated that 720.2 million shares were being offered, 
and the minimum number of shares to be applied was 400. After eighteen 
days of speculation and comments on the possible share price, it was 
announced at 125p on 27 January. The payment was divided into two 
instalments: 65p was required for the initial payment, and the balance to be 
paid in August.2 At the same time, the preliminary plan of allotment was 
revealed, according to which the City institutions would acquire through 
preplacement roughly 45% of the shares, the overseas investors (American, 
Canadian, Swiss and Japanese) roughly 20%, the employees of the company 
10% on concessionary terms, and the British public around 25%. If the 
public offer was oversubscribed three times, the portion would be increased 
at the expense of the British and overseas investors. Six days later, 
Cleveland Securities launched the grey market by buying at 80p and selling 
at 85p.3
By the closing (10:00 a.m. on 6 February), a total of 1,145,068 
applications were received with an oversubscription slightly less than ten 
times. Accordingly, the clawback mechanism was triggered. Meanwhile, the 
share price in the grey market went steadily up: 87p for buy and 92p for 
sell on 6 February. On 8 February the government announced the 
allocation. In view of the enthusiasm, it was decided to favour small 
investors.4 The British public was allotted 35% while the allocations for the
1 The merger of BCal by BA and its implications in regard to the competition policy are 
discussed in Vickers and Yarrow (1988), op. cit., pp. 352-354.
2 The detail of the offer is in ST 1 Feb., p. 60. The nominal value was 25p per share.
3 For a brief description of the grey market, see “ Dealing in the grey market” , 
Accountancy March 1987, p. 38.
4 Those who applied for 400 to 1,500 shares were allotted 200 (50% to 13.3% of the 
shares applied); for 2,000 to 5,000 shares, 250 (12.5% to 5%); for 6,000 to 10,000 
shares, 300 (5% to 3%); for 15,000 to 35,000 shares, 350 (2.3% to 1%); for 40,000 to 




























































































City institutions and overseas ones were reduced to 36.1% and 16.5%, 
respectively. The balance was reserved for the employees of the company 
and loyalty bonuses. The letters of allotment were sent from 16 February.
Transactions o f BA share at the Grey Market (2 February to 11 February 1987)
DATE Buy (p) Sell (p)





11 before 14:30 107 112
Source: Financial Times.
On 11 February at 2:30 p.m., the official dealing started by quoting 
119.5p for the first market price. There ensued massive selling and buying. 
By closing, 141.8 million shares were sold, which accounted for about 20% 
of the newly issued shares. As the table below shows, the price went down 
slightly until 17 February. Probably more cautious investors were waiting 
for letters of allotment before proceeding to selling. The next day the price 
popped up and remained around 108p to 109p until the 20th, when the 
massive sale apparently ended. In ten days, a total of more than 279.4 
million shares changed hands, which represented nearly 40% of the 
outstanding shares. During the period, BA remained the most active stock 
at the London Stock Exchange, except on the 13th and the 20th.
One noticeable fact is that the share price did not collapse despite 
massive selling. This reflects a strong demand. Given that all the small 
investors received some portion of their applications, it was the institutional 
investors that were buying eagerly. Another fact is that BA stock was also 
active at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).5 The price and the 
trading volume followed more or less the same trend as in London. Within 
the same period, an amount equivalent to 8% of the shares changed hands 
at NYSE. These two facts combined, a preliminary conclusion is that the
5 One share in the U.S. and Canada was equivalent to ten shares. Cf. FT 24 Feb., p. 26, 
26 Feb., p. 29. The number of shares allotted to the American institutions accounted for 





























































































British public, as soon as (or even before) they received the allotted shares, 
sold them to the institutional investors, a substantial part of whom were 
American.6
Transactions o f BA share at the Official Markets (11 February to 20 February 1987) 









11 Feb. 14:30 
11 close
119.5
109 141.8 16.75 28.137
12 close 108.5 33.3445 16.375 9.329
13 close 107 n.a. 16.875 5.554
16 close 106 12.5 no trading
17 close 105.5 32 16.5 5.283
18 close 109.5 39.25 16.75 5.421
19 close 108 13.5 16.5 2.723
20 close 109 7 16.875 0.913
Total 279.4 57.36
Source: Financial Times, Wall Street Journal.
The number of shareholders has been steadily decreasing. As of 15 May 
1992, the total number of shareholders is 265,819, of whom 96% possess 
not more than 1,000 shares. These small shareholdings account for less than 
10% of the outstanding shares. Viewed by another classification, individual 
shareholders, accounting for 98% in number, hold only 12% of the 
outstanding shares.7 More importantly, 41% of the outstanding shares are 
in the hands of non-UK nationals at the end of March 1992.8 To put it 
otherwise, BA is now a heavily institutionalised and internationalised 
company in terms of shareholding. Therefore, so far as the wider share 
ownership policy is concerned, BA is not a successful case.
However, it is doubtful if the British government wished to see this stock 
kept in the hands of the initial individual applicants. As argued in the 
previous chapter, the government took precautions at the outset so that
6 Salomon Brothers, one of the lead managers for the American issue, said that more 
than 300 institutions were chasing the stock. Cf. Times 12 Feb., p. 19.
7 BA, Report and Accounts 1991-92, p. 39.




























































































small investors would be deterred from applying. Notwithstanding this, the 
government was also anxious not to exclude them from the allocation. On 
the other hand, airline stock is notoriously volatile. It must be noted that 
almost no one recommended the public to keep the stock, despite a rather 
high dividend and the loyalty bonus scheme for faithful holders. The 
individuals sold for a quick profit, but quite rightly. Also, it would not be 
wrong to assume that the immediate transfer from the individuals to the 
institutional investors was not an unwelcome outcome for the government.
This consideration leads to the conclusion that the key to the whole 
process lay in two ingredients: underpricing and allocation. The former 
secured that the stock would be priced at high premium. The second 
enforced, especially after the clawback mechanism took place, the strong 
demand by the institutional investors. Finally, the high premium was a 
success for BA, too. No doubt the robust price in UK and the U.S. assured 
the company to obtain credit for expansion.
In parallel to the privatisation, BA launched a campaign to recruit 100 
pilots for the next decade; it was the first recruitment of pilots for the last 
ten years. Several plans for aircraft orders were successively announced.9 
Apart from the $2.3 billion facility, BA successfully raised £100 million in 
April.10 1The privatisation freed the company to pursue expansion.11
9 Cf. FT 19 Feb., p. 5, 25 Mar., p. 6, 15 Apr., p. 14.
10 Cf. FT 30 Apr., p. 3.
11 In October 1986, a further organisational reshuffling took place “ to enhance [the 
company’s] selling ability worldwide.”  BA, Report and Accounts 1986-87, p. 7. BA was 






























































































For many people, to fly is a joyful experience. To manage an airline, hardly 
so. BA provides a rare case of turnaround. From the business management 
point of view, it is of particular interest to see how the success was 
achieved. However, excessive generalisation is dangerous; one should bear 
in mind the particular circumstance surrounding this case. It may also be 
necessary to define the “ success” . As argued in the last chapter, the 
privatisation of BA did not conform to the government’s policy of wider 
share ownership. It could also be argued that its pricing was so low that the 
company was sold off at the expense of taxpayers. Yet these claims, 
regardless of their validity, are about the government’s policy, and 
therefore, essentially political. If the privatisation of BA was unsuccessful, 
the flotation was successful. The business world welcomed the company’s 
accession.
So far as a business organisation is concerned, profitability counts more 
than efficiency. Of course it is absurd to maintain that the efficiency of a 
company has nothing to do with its profitability; an unprofitable company 
cannot be thought efficient. Nevertheless, profitability and efficiency are 
different notions. Comparisons between airline competitiveness based on 
such measurements of efficiency as available seat kilometres per employee, 
revenue per employee, or more generally, output divided by input, are 
relevant only when unit cost is the same and when airlines compete in the 
same markets. BA may be inefficient compared with its American rivals. 
But it is profitable while many American airlines are not. The question 
should be, then, how its financial success has been achieved.
At first glance, one factor is the slimdown from 1981 to 1983. However, 
to slash payroll is an emergency measure and its effects, as shown in the 
American cases, are relatively short-lived. More importantly, the 
management introduced a series of organisational restructuring initiatives. 
The profit centre structure, and then the marketing-oriented structure, along 
with a corporate image campaign, incurred costs. Yet they were deemed 
necessary to eliminate “managerial discretionary behaviours” 1 and their 
consequences. At the same time they were to serve the purpose to establish 
commitment and loyalty among the employees. To put it otherwise, the 
reshufflings were attempted in line with motivation management. We find 
some explicit motivational factors related to pay; the pay rise in 1982, the
1 Matthias-Wolfgang Stoetzer, “ Efficiency and Prices in the European Air Transport 
Market: Some further Evidence” , in Giandomenico Majone (ed.), Deregulation or 





























































































profit sharing scheme, and the employee share ownership plan should be 
understood in this context.
As “managerial discretionary behaviours” are accumulated over a long 
period of time and deeply rooted within the organisation concerned, it 
seems necessary to bring in new managers with strong character for radical 
reforms. In the case of BA, King, and later Marshall, proved to be 
extremely fit for the task. In the case of Pan Am, Edward Acker, though 
unsuccessful in the end, fought fiercely and managed to keep the company 
aloft for some time; in Japan, the Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT) 
provides a similar case of successful privatisation under a chairman newly 
brought in. Very roughly speaking, the job of a manager consists of 
transforming a state of things in the firm or the section he or she is in 
charge of to another. In other words, the state of things a new manager 
finds is the material, out of which he or she creates a new and improved 
state of things, either in terms of physical settings or motivational factors, 
financial or numerical performances, or a combination of these elements. 
The real reward for the manager is probably this very creation. Presumably, 
to those who qualify themselves as businessmen, managerial discretionary 
behaviours are simply not acceptable.
One important fact is that King was chosen and brought into the 
company by a government that was selling off the airline to the public. BA 
did not become profitable (or efficient) out of competition. As argued in the 
introduction, it was required to become so, mainly in view of the 
privatisation policy.2 Also, the government was anxious not to hamper the 
basic advantages of BA. The route transfer was blocked;3 the company’s 
debt was largely guaranteed by the Treasury; BA’s fare setting in the North 
Atlantic with its counterparts was shielded from prosecution by the 
American authorities.
However, as the British government was also committed to competition, 
relations between the company and the government turned out to be tense 
when the inherent contradiction became apparent. The controversy over 
route transfer is the most explicit instance. Another confrontation occurred 
when BA wanted capital for expansion but the government, presumably, 
chose other state-owned organisations to be privatised before BA. In both 
cases, the management had to be political and, admittedly, its manoeuvre 
was remarkable.
On the other hand, the company’s status as a state-owned flag carrier 
helped to accomplish the turnaround. BA’s occasional threats to withdraw 
its service were based on the fact that it was the most privileged carrier in
2 The process seems similar to some other privatisations. Rolls-Royce also tried to 
improve productivity before privatisation. Cf. Hayward, op. cit., p. 161 below.




























































































UK. Being state-owned, the company was allowed to announce its results 
when it wished, a behaviour that would have led to a delisting if it had 
been a quoted company. BA also could be sure that its foreign counterparts 
would not undercut its prices. It must be added that the boom in the North 
Atlantic from 1983 to 1985 contributed substantially to improve its balance 
sheet and to displace major obstacles of flotation. The out-of-court 
settlement for Laker litigation and, to a lesser extent, the replacement of the 
pension scheme in exchange for lump sum payments would have been both 
much more difficult to achieve, if not impossible, unless BA earned its own 
way.
To put it briefly, BA exploited the circumstance. Yet any management 
unable to exploit circumstances, either political or economic, which 
surround the organisation shall be judged incompetent. To run a company 
is no candid business. Given the recovery to profitability, the consistency 
in decisions on fleet, finance and organisational restructuring, and shrewd 
exploitation of the circumstance, the management of BA under King and 
Marshall was competent. Despite threats, political tactics and buy-offs, it is 
fair to say that the management of BA was earnest in the bold sense of the 
word.
After the privatisation of BA, there followed a series of privatisations 
around the world. Japan Air Lines was wholly privatised later in the same 
year, followed by Air New Zealand and Air Canada in the next two years. 
Lufthansa, Air France and Alitalia also are lining up in the queue. In Latin 
America, a number of carriers either have been or are being privatised. In 
Asia, India and Pakistan are privatising their carriers. In Eastern Europe and 
ex-USSR, not less than a hundred carriers have been established and they 
are desperately looking for capital.
BA, now the most consistently profitable airline in the world, is 
spreading its wings over the world under Sir Colin Marshall, new chairman 
since early 1993: apart from the merger of BCal in 1987, the airline set up 
Air Russia, acquired the single largest share in TAT European (France), 
Deutsche BA (Germany), Qantas (Australia), and USAir (U.S.). It is yet to 
be seen whether this aggressive strategy to become a global carrier would 
prove correct. What is certain, however, is that BA’s acquisitions are 
consistent with its own fleet decisions, i.e., Boeing aircraft (especially 
B737s) powered by Rolls-Royce engines, and that it could afford to be 
aggressive because of its profitability. Also certain is that its acquisition of 
BCal made it possible for the British government to act for the benefit of 
BA without being criticised as unfair. It is well illustrated in the course of 
bilateral negotiations during 1991 and 1992 between the U.S. and UK 
























































































































































































BA’s airline turnover (1981-1987) (£ million)
1st Quarter 1st Half Year
1981-82 n.a. n.a. 1,861
1982-83 n.a. n.a. 2,043
1983-84 602 1,298 2,382
1984-85 682 1,491 2,797
1985-86 n.a. 1,640 2,981
1986-87 n.a. 1,559 3,054
Note: Including British Airtours.
BA’s airline operating surplus (1981-1987) (£ million)
1st Quarter 1st Half Year
1981-82 n.a. n.a. 5
1982-83 n.a. n.a. 169
1983-84 70 198 274
1984-85 81 236 303
1985-86 90 205 205
1986-87 38 151 183
Note: Including British Airtours.
BA’s airline gross operating margin by geographical area (1981-1987, %)
Europe The Americas Africa Middle East, Far East, Australasia
1981-82 0.4 -1.1 14.0 -2.8
1982-83 6.3 8.4 14.1 6.2
1983-84 9.5 12.9 13.8 10.0
1984-85 7.0 15.0 14.2 8.0
1985-86 4.4 8.4 7.8 7.0
1986-87 5.7 6.6 10.8 5.0




























































































B A ’s  G ro u p  p ro f it / lo s s  b e fo re  ta x a tio n  & ex tra o rd in a ry  item s  (1 9 8 1 -1 9 8 7 )  (£ million)
1st Quarter 1st Half Year
1981-82 n.a. n.a. -144
1982-83 n.a. n.a. 45
1983-84 47 150 185
1984-85 47 189 168
1985-86 n.a. 201 183
1986-87 n.a. 141 143
BA’s outstanding capital debt (1981-1987) (£ million)
1st Quarter 1st Half Year
1981-82 n.a. n.a. 1,011
1982-83 n.a. n.a. 1,053
1983-84 n.a. n.a. 901
1984-85 873 770 647
1985-86 n.a. 464 379
1986-87 n.a. 353 297




Stake of Small 
shareholdings (less 
than 1,001 shares)
Stake of large 
shareholdings (more 
than 1 million shares)
21 May 1987 420,526 13.65% 50.30%
18 May 1988 347,897 10.89% 58.87%
15 May 1989 338,350 10.26% 63.90%
15 May 1990 314,039 10.17% 69.94%
10 May 1991 295,970 9.59% 70.62%
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12 Sept. p. 2 “Flight chaos after ban on overtime”
15 Oct. p. 5 “Airline staff learn how to please”
25 Oct. p. 2 “British Airways may be sold a year earlier than planned”
4 Nov. p. 2 “Transfer British Airways’ routes to independents, B-Cal chief says” 
15 Nov. p. 4 “Bill to switch BA air routes ruled out”




























































































2 Dec. p. 3 “BA to reduce domestic fares” '
13 Dec. p. 28 “Ridley calls for review before BA |oes private”
1984
5 Jan. p. 2 “BA halves shuttle fare to Edinburgh”
12 Jan. p. 1 “BA looks again at Airbus”
31 Jan. p. 7 “ Competition in ‘best interests’ of air travellers” (DT)
4 Feb. p. 20 “A tempting price tag on index-linked benefits”
14 Feb. p. 20 “British Airways en route to being ‘world’s favourite’”
9 Mar. p. 3 “Big holiday firms press for curbs on BA”
13 Mar. p. 2 “British Midland offers half-price fare to Belfast”
20 Mar. p. 3 “BCal raises stakes in air routes battle”
26 Mar. p. 2 “Prices halved on London-Belfast flights”
26 Mar. p. 17 “British Airways looks at Airbus”
5 Apr. p. 3 “BA halves.shuttle flight costs”
30 Apr. p. 1 “BA to sell shares to employees”
1 May p. 19 “B-Cal chairman urges delay in sale of BA”
11 May p. 1 “£49 return to Amsterdam”
11 May p. 2 “Airline buys British”
31 May p. 21 News in brief. “British Airtours...”
2 June p. 21 “ BA pension buyout takes off”
8 June p. 2 “Long-haul obstacle to cheap fare hopes”
11 July p. 21 “Holiday airlines seek BA charter ban”
12 July p. 23 “CAA monopoly powers urged”
25 July p. 2 “ Attacks on BA over route plan”
27 July p. 3 “ £60 air fare cuts to US proposed”
31 July p. 4 “ Debate on CAA report refused”
2 Aug. p. 3 “Appeal to Thatcher for BA routes”
4 Aug. p. 3 “European air fares cartel threatened by new reductions”
8 Aug. p. 3 “Package holiday prices may rise by up to 20% next summer”
13 Aug. p. 3 “British Airways challenge to Caledonian ‘compete on any route’”
21 Aug. p. 2 “Cheap air fare”
31 Aug. p. 3 “Cut-price air fares in the high street”
6 Sept. p. 2 “BA offers to share 12 routes with airline”
7 Sept. p. 3 “Airlines to cut flight costs to Switzerland”
10 Sept. p. 1 “BA chief ready to defy Cabinet”
10 Sept. p. 12 “A bad time to clip BA’s wings”
12 Sept. p. 2 “Transfer of air routes opposed”
15 Sept. p. 1 “BA to review Airbus after Pan Am deal”
18 Sept. p. 3 “British Airways tests BAe 146”
19 Sept. p. 3 “Hitch in cheap air fares to Germany”
26 Oct. p. 1 “£40 surcharge on air fares”
31 Oct. p. 3 “Air date”
4 Dec. p. 22 “British Airways takes new image on board for trip into the nineties”
1985
2 Mar. p. 3 “Concorde link with QE2 world cruise to expand”
25 Mar. p. 10 “Manchester’s eastern promise”
8 Apr. p. 3 “BA defends the engine that failed in mid-air”






























































































17 June p. 2 “ Minister is ‘astonished’ by Lonrho”
23 July p. 5 “BA chief forecasts era of expansion after privatization next year”
2 Oct. p. 17 “BA impresses Wall Street”
12 Oct. p. 33 “Planes take the strain”
24 Oct. p. 4 “Airline finds a loophole in US fare promotion”
29 Oct. p. 3 “Concorde bait in package holiday war”
20 Nov. p. 8 US court notice
29 Nov. p. 21 “BA to take a stake in Docklands airline”
3 Dec. p. 18 “Supersonic trip”
21 Dec. p. 4 “BA cleared for dock airline stake”
31 Dec. p. 2 “Lord King’s 67% pay rise”
1986
8 Feb. p. 23 “BA flies into offer trouble”
2 May p. 3 “Airline halves Dublin fare”
16 May p. 3 “Price cuts on Dutch air link”
21 May pp. 1, 20 “BA woos US with free flights”
1 July p. 6 “ Minister calls for help on air fares”
16 Aug. p. 3 “BA cuts fares to Australia”
13 Sept. p. 13 “Excursions, sales and bargain offers - all with Australia in mind”
1987
12 Feb. p. 19 “America rushes to fly the flag”
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Vickers, John, and Yarrow, George, “Privatisation in Britain” , in MaCavoy et al., 
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Britain and Canada, Rochester Studies in Economics and Policy Issues, Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1989.
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